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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this exploratory study was to analyze and examine the differences in the
preparedness of educational institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing
their self-reported perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding riskmitigating practices. Factors that were studied with reference to securing institutional data were
aligned with the five components of information systems: hardware, software, data, procedures
and people. The study examined the perceptions of security threats associated with these factors
and explored the perceptions of the effectiveness of critical measures with respect to these
factors within the constraints applicable to educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of
the threats to information security, this study further explored mechanisms and frequencies with
which the different types of educational institutions conduct key security practices and stay upto-date in their information security policies and procedures. The population of interest for this
study consisted of a cross-sectional representation of the following types of educational
institutions in the state of Florida: public and private PK-12 institutions, public and private
universities, and virtual schools. At every stage of this explorative study, comparative analyses
were conducted. The researcher found no statistically significant differences between the types
of educational institutions in their perceptions of security risks. However, in terms of their
perceptions of the effectiveness of security measures, frequencies of key security practices and
policy updates, budget allocations, and overall assessment of security preparedness, the
educational institutions showed statistically significant differences.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of Study
As businesses, educational institutions and individuals rely more and more on technology
for operational and decision-support activities, the importance of cyber-security cannot be over
stated. This is because as technological advances happen, so do the advances in sophistication of
cyber-crimes. Data breaches costing millions of dollars happen every year (Gardner & Thomas,
2014). Different breach tracking sources report different data breach numbers, but they all
unanimously report that breaches in educational institutions remain high. In fact, according to the
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Chronology of Data Breaches report that tracks all reported data
breaches starting from 2005, almost 25 million user records have been breached in educational
institutions. In between 2005 and April 2018, there have been 815 reported data breaches in
educational institutions (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). In the 2017 and 2018 editions of
the annual data breach investigations report published by Verizon Enterprises, a total of 747
incidents were identified in educational institutions in 2016 and 2017 alone, 174 with confirmed
data disclosure (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017/2018).
Educational institutions often store a significant amount of private information, including
educational and health records, and identity information of all personnel involved which may
include students, teachers, faculty, administrators and staff (Levy & Ramim, 2016).
Unfortunately, the security measures adopted by educational institutions are often not up to the
standards desired in the world of information systems (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, Son, & Benbasat,
2015). Analyses of cyber-security often reveal that educational institutions do not adequately
address the cyber-security issues by having appropriate plans in place. Further, such analyses
1

also reveal that information security is often not considered a key requirement in many
educational institutions. Consequently, the volume of data breaches affecting educational
institutions has grown (Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014).
A data breach is defined as an incident in which an individual’s identifying information
which may include a social security number, driver’s license number, medical record or financial
record (credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at risk because of exposure. These breaches
result in identity theft, privacy violations and fraud (Data Breaches, 2018). Educational
institutions are in a unique position as compared to their industry counterparts as their user-bases
have been primarily comprised of children and young adults whose identity information once
compromised may not be misused instantly, but rather years later when they move to the
workforce. As such, a detection of a breach is more challenging (Farina, 2015). In addition, the
educational institutions are subject to different federal and state statutes that regulate data
privacy such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA], The Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standards [PCI-DSS], Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [GLBA], Red Flags
Rule, The Federal Information Security Management Act [FISMA], and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA] (Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014). Further,
they can be subject to class action lawsuits in the wake of a data breach (IT Security for Higher
Education: A Legal Perspective, 2003). Finally, significant costs, both tangible and intangible are
incurred by an affected institution whenever a breach happens (Gardner & Thomas, 2014). In an
era where budget shortage in the field of education is a recurring phenomenon, any significant
un-budgeted costs can prove to be devastating for affected institutions (Mitchell, Palacios, &
Leachman, 2014).
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Statement of the Problem
The problem that was investigated in this study was the level of preparedness of
educational institutions to ensure the security of their information. The threats to data and
information security are constantly evolving, and becoming increasingly sophisticated with time
(Vacca, 2012). Interestingly, educational institutions have endured a significant number of data
breaches in recent times. In fact, almost 25 million user records have been breached in
educational institutions between 2005 and April 2018 (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). The
cost incurred by an educational institution in the event of a data breach has increased. It was
$260 per record breached in 2017 with a four-year average of $200 per record (Cost of Data
Breach Study, 2017). Historically, there has been a reluctance on the part of educational
institutions to designate information security as a top-most priority, often due to cultural and
budgetary reasons. As such, information security practices and procedures followed in these
institutions have often been inadequate in countering the threat of sophisticated data breaches
(Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014). Consequently, they are the victims in a very high
proportion of reported data breaches. Although extensive research exists in identifying and
quantifying security threats that apply universally to all kinds of institutions, there have been few
studies focused on preparedness of educational institutions in combating such threats and
identifying areas where they are the most vulnerable.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this exploratory study was to analyze the preparedness of educational
institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing their self-reported
perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding risk-mitigating practices.
3

Factors that were studied with reference to securing institutional data were aligned with the five
components of any information system: hardware, software, data, procedures, and people
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). The researcher examined the security threats associated with these
factors and explored the critical measures with respect to these factors that can enhance security
within the constraints applicable to educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of the
threats to information security, this study was also conducted to further explore the frequencies
with which the different types of educational institutions undertake critical security practices and
stay up-to-date in their information security policies and procedures. Finally, the culture of
educational institutions, with respect to implementing information security measures as reflected
in their allocation of budgets for the same, was explored. Obtaining this information could
potentially allow for educational leaders to formulate and enforce policies and practices that will
enhance their preparedness in securing their institutional data. At every stage of this explorative
study, comparative analyses were made about the level of preparedness among different types of
educational institutions with respect to their information security related measures.
Significance of the Study
The landscape of information security in educational institutions is changing rapidly. The
concept of a lone hacker creating viruses in a basement has been relegated to the background
(Zalaznick, 2013). Instead, data breaches conducted by sophisticated foreign governments as
cyber espionage are the top cybersecurity threat today (Data Breach Investigations Report,
2017). Today’s hackers are now being deployed around the clock to steal intellectual property,
sensitive research, and personal information, potentially costing educational institutions millions
of dollars and badly damaging their reputations (Thompson, 2015). These institutions are
4

susceptible to numerous kinds of data breaches due to the open welcoming environment in which
they operate and the vast amount of data they compile from students, teachers, faculty,
employees, and other affiliated individuals. Thus, they need to balance the security of their
information systems with their focus on the uninterrupted flow of information (Amigud, ArnedoMoreno, Daradoumis, & Geurrero-Roldan, 2018). This exploratory study was intended to
provide leaders in educational institutions with relevant information relating to the self-reported
preparedness of institutions to tackle the ever-increasing threats to their data. This study may
assist in providing the decision makers with information relating to certain key areas where they
need to focus to optimize the conflicting requirements of security and convenience. This study
may also assist the decision makers with information on how to handle a post-breach situation
with respect to the various legal implications involved.
Definition of Terms
For the purpose of this explorative study, the following operational definitions were
used for key terms that pertain directly to the research being conducted.
Any information system is comprised of five components. Those are hardware,
software, data, procedure and people (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). At least one or all the five
components are typically involved in a data breach.
Hardware - Hardware is the part of an information system that can be touched – the
physical components of the technology. Computers, keyboards, disk drives, iPads, and flash
drives are all examples of information systems hardware (Bourgeois, 2014).
Software - Software is a set of instructions that tells the hardware what to do. Software is
not tangible – it cannot be touched. When programmers create software programs, what they are
5

really doing is simply typing out lists of instructions that tell the hardware what to do. There are
several categories of software, with the two main categories being operating-system software,
which makes the hardware usable, and application software, which does something useful.
Examples of operating systems include Microsoft Windows on a personal computer and
Google’s Android on a mobile phone. Examples of application software are Microsoft Excel and
Google Drive (Bourgeois, 2014).
Data - Data are comprised of a collection of facts. For example, street address, the city
where one lives in, and phone number are all pieces of data. Like software, data are also
intangible. By themselves, pieces of data are not really very useful. But aggregated, indexed, and
organized together often into a database, data can become a powerful tool for decision-making
purposes. Institutions collect all kinds of data and use it to make decisions (Bourgeois, 2014).
One of the most critical pieces of data that are stored by an institution are personally identifiable
information (PII) of its constituent individuals and entities. PII may include social security
numbers, tax identification numbers and similar unique identifiers. This is the data component
that is most routinely targeted by perpetrators (Levy & Ramim, 2016).
Procedure - A procedure is a series of steps undertaken to achieve a desired outcome or
goal (Stair & Reynolds, 2013).
People – People are the creators, operators and consumers of an information system.
People buy hardware, code software, analyze data, design procedures and finally make decisions.
An information system cannot function without the involvement of people. From programming
to data entry to the final decision making, people are involved (Stair & Reynolds, 2013).
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There are essentially four components involved in any data breach situation applicable to
educational institutions. Those are threat, vulnerability, safeguard and target (Kroenke & Boyle,
2015).
Threat - A threat is an entity that attempts to obtain and manipulate information systems
data via illegal and secretive means (Jouini, Rabai, & Aissa, 2014).
Vulnerability - A vulnerability is the opportunity that a threat may utilize to accomplish
its objectives (Austin, Holmgreen, & Williams, 2013).
Safeguard - A safeguard is the shield that blocks a threat from accomplishing its motives
(Fay & Patterson, 2018).
Target - A target is what is being coveted by the threat (Fay & Patterson, 2018).
These four components work together in the event of a data breach. For a data breach to
happen, a threat uses one or more vulnerabilities to bypass installed safeguards to reach the
target. In an educational institution, targets typically comprise user identity information.
Examples of threats include hacking, phishing, malware and ransomware that may exploit
vulnerabilities like weak passwords, user ignorance and insecure systems. These may be
prevented by adequate safeguards like firewalls, encrypted data, strong passwords and proper
training (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015).
Figure 1 shows a threat/loss scenario which illustrates the inter-play of threats,
vulnerabilities, safeguards and targets.
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Figure 1. Threat/loss scenario
Source: Kroenke, D., & Boyle, R. (2015). Experiencing MIS. Harlow, Essex, England: Pearson

Research Questions
To analyze the preparedness of educational institutions toward ensuring the security of
their data by comparing their assessments of security risks and their corresponding riskmitigating practices, the following three research questions were created. The questions were
sequentially placed as they relate to institutions’ recognition, influence, and application of factors
and their indication of the same in the research instrument used for this study.
1. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among
educational institutions with respect to identification and classification of threats, and
how do results vary across the types of institutions?
This question was further divided into five sub-questions based on the five factors of
information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015):

8

1.1.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
hardware-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.2.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for softwareoriented threats among the different types of educational institutions?

1.3.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for dataoriented threats among the different types of educational institutions?

1.4.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
procedure-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.5.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for peopleoriented threats among the different types of educational institutions?

2. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among
educational institutions with respect to institutional safeguards, frequency of critical
measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocation, and how do results
vary across the types of institutions?
This question was further divided into eight sub-questions based on the five factors of
information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015), frequency of critical measures and
security policy updates, and budgetary allocation:
2.1.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
hardware-oriented security measures among the different types of educational
institutions?
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2.2.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
software-oriented security measures among the different types of educational
institutions?

2.3.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of dataoriented security measures among the different types of educational
institutions?

2.4.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
procedure-oriented security measures among the different types of educational
institutions?

2.5.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
people-oriented security measures among the different types of educational
institutions?

2.6

What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of highfrequency critical practices among the different types of educational
institutions?

2.7.

What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of lowfrequency critical practices and security policy updates among the different
types of educational institutions?

2.8.

What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to information
security among the different types of educational institutions?
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3. What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational institutions
with respect to information security, and how do results vary across the types of
institutions?
Review of Extant Literature
This analysis focusses on the level of preparedness of educational institutions to ensure
the security of their data. Much research has been done within the field of identifying the threats
to information security; however, there is dearth of research pertaining to the self-reported
preparedness of educational institutions to handle information security threats.
Latest published literature and investigation reports often identify the frequencies, threats,
motives and the types of data that are compromised during security breaches in educational
institutions and compare them to the full picture of all areas and types of industries. For example,
75% of all reported beaches across all industries were conducted by outsiders and only 25%
involved insiders. In contrast, 30% of insiders were involved in all reported breaches in
educational institutions. Reports have also shown the changing distribution of threats in
educational institutions. In 2016, Cyber-espionage was present in 26% of breaches, with User
Errors closely behind at 22%. The previous year, the Cyber-espionage pattern accounted for only
5% of breaches while Web Application Attacks were the dominant threat. The trend in increased
espionage breaches can be possibly attributed to access to research studies across a variety of
disciplines conducted at universities. These studies are often coveted by state-affiliated groups.
The breach findings have further shown that over half of the incidents in educational institutions
involved the compromise and disclosure of stored personal information of both students and
employees, with a little over 25% resulting in the disclosure of intellectual property. Educational
11

institutions face numerous challenges that are unique when it comes to keeping sensitive
information secure. A significant challenge is often the prevalent inclusive culture based on the
free and open exchange of ideas and information. The profile of the student/user population
whose varying degrees of technical skills and curiosity must be considered, not to mention their
roles as data subjects, whose personally identifiable information (PII) and other information must
be protected (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017).
Research and findings have often suggested that compromised identifying information of
students is often not used immediately for financial transactions, keeping in mind the lowincome status of the student stage. Only when they have an established career do perpetrators
attempt identity-theft related activities. Thus, there is often a significant time lag between
compromise of information and its subsequent detection. This feature is often unique to
educational institutions (Farina, 2015).
The significantly high number of breaches occurring due to user errors (22%), notably
mis-delivery of sensitive data and publishing errors as seen in educational institutions in 2016
further suggest the lack of adequate training and preparation of support staff as compared to their
counterparts in the private industry (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017). Compounding the
problem is the often the lack of budgetary support for information security prevalent in
educational institutions (Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014). Furthermore, there are often
differences among the type of educational institutions with respect to their security policies,
technical expertise, content management, infrastructure, and budget allocations which makes
difficult the process of generalizing the picture applicable to all educational institutions (Hentea,
2005).
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These findings indicate that the cyber security landscape is changing. In fact, it is
changing very fast. The question is whether educational institutions are acknowledging the
threats and preparing themselves to handle them. Implementing security controls with reduced
budgets and training opportunities while still maintaining the culture of openness is, thus, a
balancing act that educational institution leaders have to endure. This exploratory study was
aimed at ascertaining educational institutions’ preparedness and how their preparations differed
based on types of educational institutions.
Methodology
Only after receiving the approval of the University of Central Florida’s Institutional
Review Board (Appendix A), was research for this study initiated. The data for this study were
collected using an instrument created by the researcher specifically for this study. This
questionnaire-based instrument was used to measure the preparedness of educational institutions
to ensure the security of their institutional information. The questionnaire primarily focused on
four institution-specific areas that reflected their preparedness to counter security threats. Those
are threat identification, threat mitigation practices, frequency of key security practices and
updates of established security policies and practices, and budgetary allocations to enable
security measures. The questions pertaining to these areas were further classified according to
the five components of information systems – hardware, software, data, people, and procedures
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Responses to the questionnaire were obtained from five different
types of educational institutions namely PK-12 Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools, PK-12
Virtual Schools, Public Colleges/Universities, and Private Colleges/Universities in the state of
Florida. Thereafter, the responses were aggregated based on the type of institution. Comparative
13

analyses using statistical tools such as the ANOVA and correlation analysis were performed on
the data obtained from the different types of educational institutions.
Population
The population of interest for this study consisted of a cross-sectional representation of
the following types of educational institutions in the state of Florida: PK-12 Public Schools, PK12 Private Schools, PK-12 Virtual Schools, Public Colleges/Universities, and Private
Colleges/Universities. Because the threat to institutional data applies to all educational
institutions, a representation of different types of educational institutions was necessary for an
accurate analysis as they are subjected to different levels of constraints with respect to ensuring
information security.
Instrumentation
The Information Security Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©), created by the author for this
study, was used to measure the preparedness of the educational institutions to combat
information security threats. The ISPI©, shown in Appendix B, includes sections which were
used to answer the research questions which guided this study. A draft version of the ISPI© was
created first with relevant questions aimed at answering the study’s research questions.
Thereafter, it was reviewed by an expert panel and necessary revisions were made. A cognitive
laboratory approach (Jobe, 1990) was then used to gauge comprehension and assess the cognitive
burden placed on respondents. Finally, the instrument was checked for reliability using
Chronbach’s alpha (Gliem & Gliem, 2003) (see Appendix C).
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Procedures
In March 2018, the chief information officers or their equivalent in selected educational
institutions in Florida were sent an email requesting them to complete the online ISPI©. A
hyperlink was provided in the email for the respondents to click and begin completing the
instrument. Prior to beginning the instrument, the respondents were asked for their consent to
take part in this study (Appendix D). They had to agree to participate in the ISPI© instrument
before they were able to begin. Once they were in the online instrument, the respondents were
asked to read each item carefully and select the option(s) that most closely resembled their selfperception and experience related to information security in their respective institutions.
The respondents were reminded in the informed consent that participating in this study
was voluntary and that they had the option to change their minds and stop at any time. They also
had the option to not answer any ISPI© instrument item for any reason and to withdraw at any
time. The ISPI© instrument was open for 24 days. To facilitate a high response rate, follow-up
e-mail messages were sent prior to the closing of the ISPI© instrument.
Analysis of Data
To answer Research Question 1, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI©
instrument their perceptions of the security risks associated with all recognized threats on a scale
of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. The data hereby obtained for the threats were
aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems: hardware, software, data,
people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for individual items within each of
the five factor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar institutions were grouped together
(i.e., the group mean was calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles
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for the different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of
descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and thereafter at
the type of institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to
compare threat perceptions across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent
variables were the threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems
(hardware, software, data, people, and procedures) and the independent variable was the
institution type.
To answer Research Question 2, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI©
instrument their perceptions of the effectiveness of recognized security threat prevention
measures on a scale of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. Thereafter, they were asked to
indicate on the ISPI© instrument the time intervals at which their respective institutions
reviewed and updated their specific security policies. Finally, the focus shifted to ascertaining
the institutional cultures in acknowledging the threats to data and implementing measures to
prevent breaches. Respondents were asked to answer questions on the ISPI© instrument about
their institutional allocation of operational and personnel budgetary funds and the reporting lines
of the head of information technology for this purpose. The data obtained for the threat
prevention measures were aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems:
hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for
individual items within each of the five factor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar
institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated for each item by
institution type) to obtain response profiles for the different types of institutions. The analysis of
the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response
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profiles at the factor-level and thereafter at the type of institution level. Five separate one-way
ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat prevention measures across the different
types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were the threat prevention measures
aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data,
people, and procedures) and the independent variable was the institution type. The responses
about frequencies of key security measures and security policy updates were analyzed using
descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. Two
separate ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare the frequencies of key security
measures across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were the
frequencies of key security measures and the independent variable was the institution type.
Finally, the responses obtained from similar institutions for the budget allocation percentages
were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was
completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of
institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare budget allocations for
information security across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable
was the budget allocations and the independent variable was the institution type.
To answer Research Question 3, the respondents were asked to rank their overall
information security preparedness on a scale of 1-5. The responses obtained from similar
institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type to
obtain response profiles for the different types of institutions). The analysis of the data collected
was completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of
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institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare the overall threat preparation
index across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the selfreported information security preparedness level and the independent variable was the institution
type.
In addition, analyses correlating the institutional threat identifications, threat prevention
measures, frequency of critical measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocations
with the overall institutional information security preparedness were performed. A comparative
analysis of security measures that the institutions indicated that they did not perform was also
completed.
Variables
The dependent variables for this study were the institutions’ self-reported perceptions of
security threats and effectiveness of threat prevention initiatives aggregated to the level of the
five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedure) along with
frequencies of key security measures and allocation of institutional budgets for information
security. The independent variable for this study was the different types of educational
institutions in the state of Florida involved in the study, namely public and private PK-12
institutions, public and private universities, and virtual schools.
Delimitations
Certain delimitations existed within this study. This research focused on analyzing the
preparedness of educational institutions to ensure information security. The data collected for
this research took place during the month of March 2018. The research population included chief
information officers or equivalent or their designees in a cross section of educational institutions.
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This study did not measure the long-term effects of any security measure that these institutions
may have undertaken. This study did not make any recommendations to these institutions to
implement any particular information security policy or measure.
Limitations
Certain limitations existed within this explorative study. The selected sample was not
expected to be representative of the population of interest (the state of Florida), and thus findings
were not generalizable although some findings had the potential to be generalized with caution.
The researcher examined the characteristics of the sample ex post facto to determine the extent to
which the sample might be representative of the population. In addition, this study included
responses from the persons in charge of information security at different types of educational
institutions. Differences exist in administration of security policies across similar type of
institutions and those may not be properly reflected in any conclusion drawn from the responses.
In contrast, any specific security measure adopted in an institution with some degree of success
may not have the same effect in a similar institution due to other factors. Respondents selected to
take part in this study completed the self-reported ISPI©; as such, it is possible for them to either
over rate or under rate their security policies and perceptions of security threats.
Assumptions
This study was conducted with the following assumptions: (a) the respondents responded
to the ISPI© accurately and honestly; (b) respondents voluntarily completed the ISPI© and could
have withdrawn from the study at any point in time; (c) respondents understood the vocabulary
and concepts associated with the ISPI©; and (d) the interpretation of the data accurately reflected
the perceptions of the respondents.
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Organization of the Study
The report of this exploratory research study is organized into five separate chapters.
Chapter 1 describes the background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study,
significance of the study, definition of terms, conceptual framework, research questions,
methodology, limitations, delimitations, and the assumptions of the study. Chapter 2 presents a
review of the existing literature on this topic. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and
procedures which were used in this study. It includes the selection of participants,
instrumentation, data collection, and data analysis procedures. Chapter 4 presents the study’s
findings including the results of the data analyses for the three research questions which guided
the study. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the entire study, discussion of the findings,
implications of the findings for theory and practice, recommendations for further research, and
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
Educational institutions have always been affected significantly by data breaches.
According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Chronology of Data Breaches report that tracks
all reported data breaches starting from 2005, almost 25 million user records have been breached
in educational institutions. In between 2005 and April 2018, there have been 815 reported data
breaches in educational institutions (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). In the 2017 and 2018
editions of the annual data breach investigations report published by Verizon Enterprises, a total
of 747 incidents were identified in educational institutions in 2016 and 2017 alone, 174 with
confirmed data disclosure (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017/2018). Much research has
been conducted within the fields of identifying the threats to data security, assessing their
impacts, and implementing safeguards to counter them; however little research has been
conducted pertaining to (a) the preparedness of educational institutions to handle data security
threats and (b) security practices and preparedness across different types of educational
institutions.
Information security is a dynamic area that is constantly changing (Vacca, 2012). To
keep up with this constantly changing environment, educational institutions need to identify their
existing gaps in information security areas by conducting effective risk assessments and address
those gaps with implementations of effective security measures with adequate budgetary support
(Eling & Loperfido, 2017). The unique characteristics of educational institutions, however, often
pose a challenge to attainment of this objective.
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In terms of storage of personal identifying information (PII), educational institutions have
requirements and practices that are like those of their counterparts in industry. Educational
institutions store a significant amount of PII, including educational and health records, and
identity information of all personnel involved which may include students, parents, teachers,
faculty, administrators and staff (Levy & Ramim, 2016). An average educational institution,
however, often lags behind an average industrial enterprise in terms of monetary investment and
technical infrastructure necessary for securing such PII adequately. The security measures
adopted by educational institutions are often not up to the standards desired in the world of
information systems (Cavusoglu et al., 2015). Analyses of cyber-security often reveal that
educational institutions have not adequately addressed the cyber-security issues by having
appropriate plans in place. Furthermore, such analyses also reveal that information security has
often not been considered a key requirement in many educational institutions. Consequently, the
volume of data breaches affecting educational institutions has constantly grown. (Powerhouses
and Benchwarmers, 2014). Data breaches are expensive. Once their security infrastructure is
breached, educational institutions often incur additional expenses in the terms of legal costs,
post-breach remedial costs and intangible costs like loss of goodwill (Gardner & Thomas, 2014).
Also, they can be subject to class action lawsuits in the wake of a data breach (IT Security for
Higher Education: A Legal Perspective, 2003). In an era, where budget shortage in the field of
education is a recurring phenomenon, all these factors may continue to contribute to the existing
monetary investment deficit for information security that educational institutions have with
industrial enterprises (Mitchell et al., 2014).
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In terms of timings of breach detection, educational institutions are in a disadvantageous
position as compared to their industry counterparts. The user-base of educational institutions has
typically been comprised of children and young adults whose identity information once
compromised may not be misused instantly, but often years later when they move to the
workforce. As such, a detection of a breach is more challenging (Farina, 2015).
In terms of operating culture, there are differences too between educational institutions
and industrial enterprises. Although industrial enterprises tend to operate in a profit-centric
closed environment, educational institutions have a relatively open culture focused on learning
and learner convenience. Thus, the dilemma of balancing the conflicting needs of security and
convenience is much higher in educational institutions (Strawser & Joy, 2015).
Thus, information security has been and continues to be a critical yet relatively neglected
area in educational institutions. Furthermore, there are potential differences among the types of
educational institutions in terms of operating media (example virtual schools vs traditional
schools), budgetary support, data breach targets (protected research materials in universities vs
PII in schools), security policies, technical expertise, content management, infrastructure, and
budget allocations. This makes the process of generalizing the picture applicable to all
educational institutions difficult (Hentea, 2005). A comparative analyses of security
preparedness among the different types of educational institutions is essential.
This chapter, based on review of literature pertaining to information security in
educational institutions, consists of eight sections. The first section concentrates on the
characteristics of data stored in educational institutions and their vulnerabilities. The second
section illustrates some major data breaches in educational institutions that occurred in recent
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years. The third section illustrates the costs of a data breach, highlighting the difficulties of
ascertaining such costs. The fourth section highlights the post-breach requirements and legal
implications. The fifth section identifies the known common threats that take advantage of
vulnerabilities in the five components of information systems. The sixth section concentrates on
the known safeguards against data breaches. The seventh section identifies critical measures that
institutions need to perform frequently to better protect themselves from security threats, and
finally the eighth section illustrates the impact of budgetary support for information security in
educational institutions.
An understanding of the literature pertaining to information security discussed in the
following eight sections was instrumental in designing the Information Security Preparedness
Instrument (ISPI©) that was created and used exclusively for this study.
Data in Educational Institutions
The bulk of the data stored in information systems maintained for educational institutions
can be classified into three main categories: (a) personal identifying information from school
records, (b) information stored in medical centers, and (c) financial information (Kroenke &
Boyle, 2015). Following are descriptions of the data in each of these categories.
Personal identifying information from school records (PII) refers to attributes that can
uniquely identify a person. These data can include name, address, birth-date, social security
number, and financial information (Chen, Wu, Shen, & Ji, 2011). Educational institutions store a
large volume of personal information data from students, faculty, teachers, parents, staff and
administrators (Markos, Labrecque, & Milne, 2018). Data breaches of PII in recent times have
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occurred in relatively smaller educational institutions as well as in premier institutions of higher
education (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018).
In regard to information stored in medical centers, many educational institutions,
particularly higher education institutions have medical centers on or off campus that treat
students, staff and often the public as well. In case of large universities that have a medical
school, such centers are part of the institution itself. These medical centers store PII and medical
records of patients. In recent times, the number of healthcare data breaches in such medical
centers have continued to increase. Sometimes breaches are targeted at campus student health
centers, rather than large-scale medical centers (McLeod & Dolezel, 2018). Under section
13402(e)(4) of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH Act), institutions that experience a breach of unsecured protected health information
affecting 500 or more individuals must report to the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, who then must report a list of the breaches. Therefore, the institutions are
required to publicize any large-scale compromise of confidential or sensitive information that
they have experienced (Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2018).
Student financial information which includes account balances, loan history, credit
information, credit cards, debit cards, and other payment forms is often stored in the information
systems maintained by educational institutions. Many institutions have put in place payment card
systems that allow students to make payments on-campus and at certain off-campus venues
(Ngai, Hu, Wong, Chen & Sun, 2011). Additionally, these institutions often use consumer credit
reports for background checks on employees and for determining if students should obtain loans
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). This wide array of financial information is extremely valuable to
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perpetrators interested in identity theft and is therefore very vulnerable to data breaches
(Shannon & Farley, 2012).
Breaches in Educational Institutions – Case Studies
Breaches Involving Personal Identifying Information
On February 4, 2016, The University of Central Florida (UCF) notified current and
former students of a data breach when they discovered unauthorized access into the university
system. Two groups of individuals associated with UCF were primarily affected. The first group
included some current student-athletes, as well as some former student-athletes who last played
for UCF in 2014-15. This group also included some student staff members, such as managers,
supporting UCF teams. The second group included current and former university employees in a
category known as OPS, or Other Personal Services. Examples of positions in this category
include undergraduate student employees (including those in work-study positions), graduate
assistants, housing resident assistants, adjunct faculty instructors, and student government
leaders. The University responded by offering free credit monitoring services, launching a largescale investigation into the breach, and holding information sessions on information security
(Data Security/Data Breach, 2016).
On September 15, 2015, Louisiana State University (LSU) reported that a doctor
associated with the LSU Health New Orleans School of Medicine had his laptop stolen which
may have exposed the personal information of 5,000 patients. The laptop computer was stolen
from the doctor’s vehicle when it was parked in front of his home on July 16 or 17. The theft was
reported, but the item was not recovered at the time of the report. The information contained on
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this laptop included names, dates of birth and medical information of the affected patients. LSU
offered a one-year subscription to a credit monitoring service for any patients affected by the
breach (LSU doc’s stolen laptop, 2015).
On October 1, 2014, the Provo City School District notified employees of a "phishing"
attack attempted on Monday September 29, 2014 which allowed access to employee’s email
accounts. Some employee email accounts contained files that may have had personally
identifiable information (Provo City School District, 2014).
On February 18, 2014, the University of Maryland reported a breach of data systems by a
computer security attack. The breached database included 287,580 records of students, staff,
faculty, and affiliated persons. The data accessed included names, dates of birth, University
identification numbers, and social security numbers of affected individuals. The University
responded by offering free credit monitoring services, launching a large-scale investigation into
the breach, and holding information sessions on data privacy (UMD Data Breach, 2014).
On February 25, 2014, Indiana University notified the Indiana Attorney General that
personal data for students and recent graduates might have potentially been exposed, including
names, addresses, and social security numbers for roughly 146,000 individuals. The University
opened a call center to establish whether or not any of the individuals were victims of identity
theft. Because the data were encrypted, it was difficult for hackers to decode and ultimately, no
cases of identity theft were found. In July 2014, the University shut down the call center and
closed the investigation, but not until after spending a reported $130,000.67 (IU says no victims
reported in data breach, 2014).
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Personal information can also be found in admissions records stored in educational
institutions. In March 2013, hackers accessed a database of student admission records at
Kirkwood Community College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. They used an international Internet
Protocol (IP) address to unlawfully access a website maintained by the college with archived
application information. The information accessed may have included applicant names,
birthdates, race, contact information and social security numbers. The Community College
responded by alerting law enforcement, hiring an outside firm to do a forensic analysis of the
breach, and offering credit monitoring to affected individuals (Kirkwood Website Experienced
Unlawful Access, 2013).
Breaches Involving Medical Records
On November 26, 2013, the University of Pennsylvania reported a paper breach that
affected 3,000 individuals. Additionally, there was a paper theft on the same campus affecting
661 individuals that occurred from May 1, 2014 to June 19, 2014. The paper theft involved
stolen receipts from a locked office that included information such as patient name, date of birth,
and the last four digits of credit card numbers. The University sent notification letters and began
an internal investigation (Burling, 2014).
In March 2014, the University of California – Irvine experienced a breach of student
information. Three computers in the Student Health Center were infected with a keylogging virus
that captured keystrokes as the user typed and transmitted that information to hackers. The
information collected included names, unencrypted medical information, bank names as well as
addresses and other medical information. The University offered free credit reporting services to
affected students (UC Irvine Student Heath Center, 2014).
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Cost of Data Breaches
Data breaches cost money. In some cases, the cost of a data breach is so large that it can
put an enterprise out of business. The cost of data breaches often includes regulatory fines such
as HIPAA/HITECH and PCI DSS. Other costs result from loss of business, state notification
laws, and fixing the security issues that lead to the breach (Gardner & Thomas, 2014). It is often
extremely difficult to determine the full extent of the financial and data losses due to a security
breach. As a result, a relatively small number of organizations calculate such costs due to the
complexity and unknowns involved, and even fewer publish such findings (Furnell, 2009). In
2015, Kroenke and Boyle reported there were no standards for tallying and calculating cybercrime costs. Moreover, they raised some unanswered questions:
a. Does the cost of a cyber-attack include lost employee time, lost revenue and long-term
revenue losses due to loss of clients or customers?
b. What is the cost that may result from the loss of goodwill or reputation that an institution
invariably endures after a data breach?
c. If an equipment for example a laptop worth $1,500 is stolen, does the replacement cost
include the value of the data that was stored in it or the cost of the time necessary to
replace it or re-install software on it?
Studies to determine cost of cyber-crimes have almost always been based on surveys. Often
different respondents interpret terms differently (Leveson, 2012). Moreover, there are some
organizations that do not report all their losses and there are some that do not report cyber-crime
losses at all (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). In the absence of standards and accurate ways of
gathering crime data, estimates are not always reliable (Leveson, 2012).

29

One potential helpful metric is year-to-year trend analysis, assuming the same methodology
is used by the various survey respondents. Table 1 shows the results of such a survey completed
over four years from 2010 to 2013 (Cost of Cyber Crime Study – Ponemon Institute, 2013).
Amounts shown are in millions of US dollars and indicate computer crime costs per
organizational respondent. This survey was commissioned by Hewlett-Packard and performed by
the Ponemon Institute, a consulting group that specializes in computer crime.

Table 1
Computer Crime Costs*: Ponemon Institute
Costs
Maximum
Median
Minimum

2010
$51.9
$3.8
$1.0

2011
$36.5
$5.9
$1.5

2012
$46.0
$6.2
$1.4

2013
$58.1
$9.1
$1.3

Note. Costs shown in millions of US dollars
Source. Cost of Cyber Crime Study – Ponemon Institute (2013).

These data underline the problems of tallying crime data from surveys. For example, in 2013,
no organization reported a figure less than $1.3 million in loss. It is reasonable to assume that the
survey did not include small companies that incurred much smaller losses. Given the large
number of small companies, those unknown and unaccounted losses could be substantial (Cost of
Cyber Crime Study – Ponemon Institute, 2013).
Recent studies have indicated that the cost incurred by an educational institution in the
event of a data breach is increasing and was $260 per record breached in 2017 with a 4-year
average of $200 per record (“Cost of Data Breach Study”, 2017).
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Post-Breach Requirements
The most critical component of a data breach for an educational institution is its financial
implications. Some of these institutions, particularly the smaller ones are not prepared for the
high costs of remedying and recovering from a breach and providing services to victims of the
breach (O’Neil, 2014). In addition, only a few institutions have had cyber insurance to help
offset these costs. Post-breach expenses can include forensics consultants, lawyers, call centers,
websites, mailings, identity-protection and credit-check services, and litigation. An intangible
expense is the damage to an institution’s reputation that occurs when it experiences a breach of
data security (O’Neil, 2014). It can be especially difficult for public institutions that rely on state
funding to absorb the costs of a cyber-attack (Bielski, 2005).
Data breach insurance is available to educational institutions to help protect them in case
a breach occurs. As the threat of cyber-attacks has increased, so have the number of companies
buying cyber insurance. Some insurance carriers have begun to specifically market cyber
insurance for educational institutions. Insurance benefits may include protections for breach of
contract claims, computer forensics, notification costs, regulatory actions, healthcare protections
in the case of an on-campus medical center, and hacker damage (Young, Lopez, Rice, Ramsey &
McTasney, 2016).
Unfortunately, cyber insurance is expensive and often difficult to obtain. Some insurance
companies have required institutions to have strong security procedures in place to be eligible for
insurance. If the educational institutions are implementing proper procedures per the FERPA
guidelines and the GLBA Safeguard Procedures, their chances of obtaining such insurance
increase (Fernandes, 2014).
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Timely notification is important. It is important for educational institutions to be familiar
with their state’s data breach notification laws. There is a wide variation in the laws of each state
with respect to the definition of what constitutes a data breach, what a timely notification is, and
who needs to be notified. Moreover, some states impose data protection laws on out-of-state
entities, which means physical presence in the state is often not required for an institution to be
subject to the law. Therefore, if an institution has students from a wide array of states, it may be
subject to the notification requirements of each state (Bakhshi, Papadaki & Furnell, 2009).
In Florida, the notification must occur no later than 30 days following determination of
the breach. Some state statutes do not have any set amount of time but rather require notification
in the most expedient time possible (Burdon, Reid & Low, 2010).
Most educational institutions deal with breaches by offering free credit monitoring to the
affected individuals which may include students, faculty, teachers and staff. This involves
significantly high costs which might make it more difficult for smaller entities to fund (Young et
al., 2016). Offering credit monitoring is often a positive response to a data breach that might
convince victims not to sue and convince the court not to levy too harsh a penalty in the case of a
suit (UMD Data Breach, 2014).
Legal Implications of Data Breaches
Educational institutions are subject to federal regulations and state statutes which dictate
the legal implications of a data breach. Some of the most important ones include the following:
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA), FERPA and Cloud Computing, FERPA and Online Educational Services,
State Consumer Protection Statutes. These are discussed in the following paragraphs
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) focuses on health
insurance portability and on the prevention of health care fraud and abuse by the adoption of
standards and requirements for electronic transmission of health information. There are three
separate part of HIPAA’s information security component: the privacy regulations, the electronic
transaction standards, and the security regulations. These three parts regulate the security
standards for protected health information, the privacy of patient-identifiable information, and
the standardization of electronic transactions (Sitko, 2003).
Education institutions fall under the definition of an entity covered under HIPAA if they
provide health care services and engage in one or more covered electronic transactions.
Electronic transactions include health care claims, health care payments, coordination of
benefits, eligibility for a health plan, and enrollment in a health plan (Liginlal, Sim, Khansa, &
Fearn, 2012 ). Many educational institutions fall under HIPAA because they provide health
services to students and often run medical centers in association with their medical programs.
However, because of the exception for FERPA educational records, if a center solely services
students, it may be exempt from HIPAA (Sitko, 2003).
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act
covers electronic medical records and requires a covered entity to notify affected individuals
when unsecured personal health information has been breached. It extended application of both
the security and privacy rules of HIPAA. It also amended HIPAA to increase civil and criminal
penalties, require notification of data breaches, and change disclosure rules, among others (Stark,
2010).
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The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) covers educational institutions
that receive funds for programs administered by the Department of Education. The information
covered includes education records, defined as records that contain information directly related
to a student and are maintained by the educational institution. Additionally, directory information
is covered, defined as information that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion
of privacy if disclosed. Because directory information is not harmful, all that is required of a
covered educational institution is public notice of the categories of information which it has
designated as such information. Like HIPAA, FERPA does not establish a private cause of
action. Only the Secretary of Health and Human Services can bring an action to enforce FERPA
(Hillison, Pacini, & Williams, 2001). In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that
a plaintiff could not sue for damages under 28 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce a FERPA provision
(Gonzaga University v. Doe, 2002).
The use of cloud computing has increased significantly in recent years. Some critics have
suggested amendment of FERPA with respect to cloud computing to promote more efficient
usage. Educational institutions are beginning to take advantage of the convenience of cloud
computing as they are drawn to its increased efficiency, mobile access, innovation and access to
new services. They are moving storage, messaging, video conferencing and computing power to
the cloud (Chopra, Mung, & Chopra, 2013).
In recent years, online education has increased significantly. This has caused a significant
increase in the use of online educational services including software, mobile applications, and
web-based tools created by third parties by educational institutions. Some of these services use
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FERPA-protected information, while others collect metadata related to that information (Moore
& Shelton, 2013).
Most states have data breach notification laws. While many such laws have broad
provisions that hold anyone in possession of personal information liable for a data breach, some
of them are considerably narrower in that they only require notification by specific agencies or
businesses in the event of a breach. Moreover, states differ as to who must be notified; some
require notification only to consumers, while others require entities to notify credit reporting
agencies or the government (Romanosky, Telang, & Acquisti, 2008).
Threats Affecting Educational Institutions
A threat is an entity that attempts to obtain and manipulate information systems data via
illegal and secretive means (Jouini et al., 2014). The many threats that are encountered today in
the world of information systems that may apply to educational institutions can be broadly
grouped into five main categories based on the components of information systems: (a)
hardware, (b) software, (c) data, (d) procedures and (e) people (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). The
following paragraphs provide additional detail regarding each of these five main categories.
Hardware-Oriented Threats
Theft
Theft of electronic devices is a major source of data breaches. These devices can include
laptops, desktop computers, portable electronic devices such as smart phones, or intact hard
drives. A study conducted in 2010 found that theft of such devices compromised seven million
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sensitive medical records, and student personal information records from 2009 to the beginning
of 2010 (Rhodes & Polley, 2014).
Many educational institutions have a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy that allows
users to use their personal devices for professional work (Nicholson & O’Reardon, 2009).
Allowing personal devices often allows the transfer of confidential institutional information to
the device. Because the device is personal, the educational institution cannot adequately control
its security protocols and access policies. Thus, the theft of such personal devices, which are
often not encrypted, can put student information at risk (Rhodes & Polley, 2014).
Natural Disasters
This category includes fires, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural disasters
that an educational institution may encounter. For example, given their geographic location,
educational institutions in Florida are often prone to exposure by hurricanes every year.
Extensive loss to institutional data might take place due to natural disasters if adequate measures
are not undertaken. Most educational institutions have extensive disaster recovery plans to help
them recover quickly in the event a natural disaster takes place. (Conrad, Misenar, & Feldman,
2016).
Sniffing
Sniffing is a technique for intercepting network-based traffic and communications
between a source and a destination computer. If wired networks are involved, this technique
relies on physical connectivity. However, with wireless networks which are used heavily
nowadays, no such physical connection is necessary. Network sniffers simply take devices with
wireless connections through an area and search for unprotected wireless networks. If they find
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one, they can easily monitor and intercept wireless traffic. Sometimes, even wireless networks
that are protected are vulnerable if the security protocols enforced are not strong enough
(Singleton, Singleton & Gottlieb, 2006).
Payment Card Skimmers
Payment card skimmers are often used by perpetrators to electronically capture a victim's
personal information from their credit or debit cards. This information can be subsequently used
by identity thieves. The skimmer is a small device that scans a credit card and captures the
personal information contained in the magnetic strip of the credit card. Educational institutions
that deploy payment terminals that accept credit or debit card payments are often vulnerable to
have users’ PII stolen using such skimmers. Duplicate cards are often created using that
information and used thereafter, almost immediately, before such a fraudulent use can be
detected (Rockwell, 2013).
Software-Oriented Threats
Ransomware
Ransomware is a form of software that prevents or limits users from accessing their
systems or personal computers. This type of software forces its victims to pay a demanded
ransom through certain specified online payment methods to regain access to their systems, or to
reclaim their data back. The ransom price is often quoted in its bitcoin equivalent. It is important
to note that paying the ransom does not guarantee that users eventually regain access to the
infected system. In certain cases, they only reclaim part of the data (Al-rimy, Maarof, & Shaid,
2018).
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Users may encounter this threat through a variety of means. Ransomware can be
inadvertently downloaded by unsuspecting users if they visit malicious or compromised
websites. Some ransomware is often delivered as an attachment to an email. Once executed in
the system, ransomware can either lock the computer screen or encrypt predetermined files with
a key. In the first scenario, ransomware shows a full-screen image or notification, which prevents
victims from using their system. This notification typically delivers the instructions on how users
can pay for the ransom. The second type of ransomware locks files like documents, spreadsheets
and other important files (Mansfield-Devine, 2017).
Two very common and fast-spreading ransomwares are the WannaCry and the LOCKY.
These ransomwares spread typically via attachments to emails often as a JavaScript-file. They
can also be spread through executable files. Once the attachment is accessed, the JavaScript runs
a program that encrypts all files on the user’s computer including those on network drives,
removes the originals and deletes any system restore point so that the machine can never be
reverted to an earlier state. It then creates a desktop message (as shown in Figure 2) that asks the
user to pay the ransom using bitcoins via a TOR browser (Furnell & Emm, 2017).

Figure 2. Ransomware – LOCKY.
Source: Stetson University. (2018). Information Security Handbook. DeLand, FL.
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Unless the user has the data backed up in an alternate location, data-loss is inevitable in
such a scenario. A South Carolina school district paid an estimated $10,000 in 2016 when cybercriminals locked its computer servers. As per the Federal Bureau of Investigation, cybercriminals collected $209 million using ransomware in the first three months of 2016 by extorting
businesses and institutions to unlock computer servers. (Fitzpatrick & Griffin, 2016).
Malware
The term malware refers to an assortment of viruses, spyware, and other unwanted
software that can get installed on a users’ computers or mobile devices without their knowledge
or consent. This often happens when a user visits a malicious website or downloads an
unauthorized program from the web (Noor, Abbas, & Shahid, 2018). These programs can cause
the device to crash. More importantly, they can be used to monitor and control the user’s online
activity. They can often make the device deliver unwanted or inappropriate ads (Pectas &
Acarman, 2017).
There are many different types of malware, from spyware to key loggers, to computer
viruses. Some types of malware, such as financial malware, which is designed to scan a
computer system for information related to financial transactions, are more common than other
types (Noor et al., 2018). One example is a malware named Cridex. It monitors login pages,
cookies and steals user credentials (Touchette, 2016). Other common ones like the FAKEAV
malware trick users into purchasing bogus anti-malware software by showing fake anti-malware
scanning results (Pectas & Acarman, 2017).
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Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection
SQL injection is a type of security attack in which the attacker adds Structured Query
Language (SQL) code to a web form input box, which in turn makes changes to data within the
database. This allows the perpetrator to gain access to unauthorized resources and information.
This information may include sensitive institutional data, user lists or personal information of
users, which are typically used for subsequent fishing attacks (Cherry, 2015).
Web Application Attacks
Web application attacks are conducted using software programs that are written to probe
a user's computer and automatically exploit security holes or vulnerabilities if any. Such exploits
may provide a path into the user's system core for subsequent deeper intrusions (Wilhelm, 2013).
Some hackers may inject malicious code within vulnerable web applications to trick users and
redirect them towards phishing sites that they maintain. This technique is called cross-site
scripting and may be used even when there are no vulnerabilities in the associated web servers
and database engines. (Razzaq, Latif, Ahmad, Hur, Anwar, & Bloodsworth, 2014).
Outdated Anti-Virus and Anti-Malware Software
Anti-virus and anti-malware software on personal computers and servers protect the
machines from viruses and other malware threats. However, if these software programs are not
kept up to date, they lose their efficiency and effectiveness as they cannot detect any newer
threats that are created almost on a daily-basis (Bourne, 2014).
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Data-Oriented Threats
Unpatched systems
Computer systems and machines that have not been kept up to date with the latest
security patches are the most vulnerable to be exploited. Unfortunately, some institutions are
never up-to-date with their patching process due to lack of resources or personnel. In fact,
patching computers is sometimes regarded as a tedious exercise and is not always seen as a
vulnerability concern. Institutions often shy away from addressing regular patches and routine
software upgrades because they have concerns about price, time, and complexity. Therefore,
exploitation of unpatched systems remains a serious risk to institutions and the underlying cause
of many data breaches (Andress, 2014). Recent years have seen significant advances in
automated patching mechanisms, yet managing updates remains a challenge. Factors like the
sheer number of updates, limited bandwidth, lack of security personnel can discourage
institutions from patching as often as they should. This creates a security gap which can expose
institutional data for unauthorized access (Furnell, Niekerk, & Clarke, 2014).
Cyber – espionage
The term cyber-espionage stands for a set of processes that deals with the theft of
intellectual property and confidential information from computer systems. Often these processes
are politically motivated (Shakarian, Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013). In the education sector, cyberespionage primarily targets institutions of higher education, especially research universities as
they usually store a vast collection of expensive and often unpublished research work
(Thompson, 2015).

41

Institutional Data on Personal Devices
Increased use of personally owned devices offers convenience, productivity gains, and
job satisfaction. Many educational institutions have a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy
that allows users to use their personal smart phones, tablets or laptops for professional work
(Nicholson & O’Reardon, 2009). There are, however, significant risks of data exposure if these
devices are accessed by unauthorized individuals or entities. In addition, there is always a risk
that data used on a personal device might violate institutional contracts or violate state or federal
laws and regulations (Rhodes & Polley, 2014).
Unencrypted Data Transfers
Educational institutions receive and send a large volume of data as part of their routine
operations. Such data is transmitted through computer networks all the time. To maintain the
security of the data being transferred, it needs to be encrypted with security keys which can only
be decrypted by the intended recipient. If left unencrypted, sensitive data may be intercepted and
exposed (Rashti, Sabin, & Kettimuthu, 2016).
Institutional Data on Third Party Services
With the advent of cloud-based services, more and more institutional data are being
shared with third-party providers of cloud-based services to conduct business. Institutional data
remains vulnerable if adequate security measures are not implemented by such third-party
providers (Tan, Hijazi, Lim, & Gani, 2018).
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Procedure-Oriented Threats
Hacking
Hacking involves breaking into computers, servers, or networks to steal data such as
customer lists, product inventory data, employee data, and other proprietary and confidential data
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Typically, inadequate security protocols implemented by the system
administrators or unsafe practices by its users facilitate the processes involved in hacking. Those
include weak passwords, short passwords, and commonly-used passwords among others. Short
passwords are especially vulnerable to a brute force attack in which the password cracker tries
every possible combination of characters. The shorter the password, the higher the chances of it
being cracked. Commonly-used passwords like “password” are relatively easy to guess (Shen,
Yu, Xu, Yan, & Guan, 2016). Sophisticated probing processes used by hackers often scan
browser cookies on public computers. Browser cookies are small files that a browser stores on a
user’s computer. When the user visits web sites, cookies enable access to sites without having to
sign in every time, and they speed up processing on some sites. However, some cookies also
contain sensitive security data from visited authenticated sites that may be read by malicious
hackers (Gold, 2011).
Spoofing
Spoofing is term used to describe someone pretending to be someone else. Internet
Protocol (IP) spoofing occurs when an intruder uses another web-site’s IP address to masquerade
as the original web-site (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). By modifying the source address of attacking
traffic to an address assigned to others or not assigned, or by using a proxy-machine with a fake
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IP address, attackers can hide their actual locations, or bypass established access control rules
(Yao, Bi, & Xiao, 2013).
Denial of Service
A denial of service (DoS) is a type of attack where the attackers attempt to prevent
legitimate users from accessing a service. In a DoS attack, the attacker sends an extremely high
number of bogus messages asking the network or server to authenticate requests which in turn
have invalid return addresses. Consequently, the network or server is unable to find the return
address of the attacker when sending the authentication approval, causing the server to wait
before closing the connection. When the server closes the connection, the attacker sends more
bogus authentication messages with invalid return addresses. Hence, the process of
authentication and server wait will resume, keeping the network or server extremely busy and
inaccessible for legitimate users (Oliveira, Laranjeiro, & Vieira, 2015).
Elevation of Privilege
A privilege elevation attack is a type of network intrusion that takes advantage of errors
in programming logic or flaws in design to grant the attacker elevated access to the network.
Elevation of privilege results from an attacker gaining authorization permissions above and
beyond those originally granted. For example, an attacker with a privilege set of read only
permissions somehow elevates the set to include read and write (Knapp & Langill, 2015).
Inadequate Security Monitoring
Even the most sophisticated security measures can be rendered ineffective without
adequate monitoring. Monitoring a computer system typically includes installing software on the
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network that sends alerts to the administrators of the system about any issues that the system may
be experiencing. Additional benefits of real-time analytics may be obtained by using such
monitoring software. Unfortunately, some institutions are not pro-active in implementing
security monitoring which increases the possibilities of intrusion attempts going undetected
(Sanders, 2014).
Inadequate Backups of Institutional Data
Inadequate data backups invariably cause critical data losses. Data volume, limited
storage capacity, and inadequate backup and restore policies are backup related challenges. At
the time of the present study, explosive data growth had further compounded these performance
and capacity issues. To maintain efficiency of institutional operations, data needs to be backed
up frequently, restored quickly, and protected constantly (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015).
People-Oriented Threats
Improper Disposal Practices
Although most personal information is now stored electronically, there can be breaches
resulting from an improper disposal of paper records involving personally identifiable
information (Leveson, 2012). These paper breaches make up nearly 26% of breaches
(Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). Sometimes the breach comes from something as simple as
a user throwing confidential institutional information in the trash as opposed to taking more
secure measures such as shredding them before disposing. The same issue can arise with
electronic records due to the improper disposal of hard drives or other media in publicly
accessible places (Leveson, 2012).
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User Errors
User errors may result from accidental and/or negligent human actions. For example, a
school system database administrator may inadvertently install an old database on top of an
existing one causing loss or corruption of data. In contrast, a school administrative staff-member
may store a data file with confidential information on a publicly accessible folder, thereby
exposing it to the whole world via the web (Leveson, 2012).
Phishing
Phishing is a technique for obtaining unauthorized data that primarily happens via email
messages. The perpetrator claims to be a legitimate company and sends an email (that looks very
similar to the original site in look and feel) requesting confidential data, such as social security
numbers, and account passwords, among others (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Often, they send a
link in an email that takes the user to a fake login page that looks very similar to one that the
recipient is accustomed to visit. The unsuspecting user may enter his credentials on such a page
thereby exposing them to the perpetrator (Aleroud & Zhou, 2017).
Weak Passwords
Some passwords are easy to guess or crack with password identification algorithms.
These include weak passwords, short passwords, and commonly used passwords among others.
Short passwords are especially vulnerable to a brute force attack in which the password cracker
tries every possible combination of characters. The shorter the password, the higher the chances
of it being cracked. Commonly-used passwords like “password” are relatively easy to guess
(Shen et al., 2016).
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Malicious Insider
Malicious insider threats refer to deliberate attempts by an insider to access and
potentially harm an organization's data, systems or IT infrastructure often for financial gain,
retribution, or some other motivation (Jones, 2008). These types of threats are often extremely
difficult to detect and mitigate, as an insider may potentially be more knowledgeable than an
external attacker about the target system and is therefore more effective at defeating security
controls that mainly defend against external attacks (Liu, Wang, & Camp, 2008).
Safeguards against Data Breaches
Information is one of the most prominent assets for educational institutions and therefore
needs to be protected from security threats. Prevention of data breach initiatives involve applying
safeguards at both personal and institutional levels (Joshi & Singh, 2017). Some critical
safeguards classified using the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data,
procedures, and people) are as follows:
Hardware-Oriented safeguards
Removing Stored Personal Identifying Information from Computers and Mobile Devices
Computers and mobile devices may potentially store personal identifying information
(PII) of the owner. By using secure encryption techniques or by relying on biometric
characteristics, such storage of PII may be avoided. In the event such devices are stolen or
accessed by an unauthorized person, the absence of any PII on such devices may limit further
damage of such being exposed (Lee, 2017).
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Using Biometric Authentication for Accessing Secure Areas
Biometric authentication is a security process that relies on the unique biological
characteristics of individuals to verify their identities. Finger-prints are the most commonly used
biometric characteristics that uniquely identify an individual. In recent times, eye-retina and
face-recognitions have been increasingly used by institutions as well. Biometric authentication
systems compare a biometric data capture to stored, authentic data in a secure database. If both
match, authentication is confirmed. Typically, biometric authentication has been used to manage
access to resources such as buildings, rooms and mobile devices (Ogbanufe & Kim, 2018).
Software-Oriented Safeguards
Clearing Browsing History, Temporary Files and Cookies from Public Computers
Using cookies and browsing history that are stored on a user's machine may result in
information may be obtained that may subject a user's account to unauthorized access. Further, a
user may leave the machine without logging out from all services. Thus, on a public machine, the
next user may get access to the previous user’s information. A critical safeguard in this situation
for educational institutions is to program the system so that cookies and browsing history are
removed from the browser when the user signs off. A provision to time out the user session once
the user leaves his machine unattended after a certain amount of time has elapsed is helpful as
well (Jia, Chen, Dong, Saxena, Mao, & Liang, 2015).
Regularly Updating Anti-Virus and Anti-Malware Software
Anti-virus and anti-malware software on all institutional computers and servers protect
those machines from virus and malware threats. However, if they are not kept up to date, they
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lose their efficiency as they cannot detect new threats. Thus, keeping them automatically updated
is critical for educational institutions(Townsend, 2010).
Installing Institutional Firewall
To protect the institutional network from security threats on the public internet, an
educational institution may implement a firewall at the intersection of the institutional network
boundary and the internet. The border firewall operates a “default deny” policy. This means that
only traffic that has been specifically permitted is allowed through the firewall (Goralski, 2017).
Installing Institutional Virtual Private Network
A VPN, or Virtual Private Network, is a service that allows a user to connect to the
internet via a server run by a VPN provider. All data traveling between the user's computer,
phone or tablet and this “VPN server” is securely encrypted. Educational institutions may allow
access to critical web-based services and applications from off-campus locations only via the
VPN to prevent network-based intrusions (Richter & Wood, 2016).
Data-Oriented Safeguards
Using Central Authentication and Single Sign on
Central authentication allows applications to authenticate the user based on credentials
stored in a single repository. Single sign on allows users to access multiple applications after
providing their credentials only once. In other words, a user can login to multiple webapplications using the same username and password. Once the users are logged in to one webapplication, they are not required to provide their credentials for accessing another webapplication. They are signed on by default. Implementing both these measures allows the
educational institutions to focus on implementing advanced security protocols at the sign in stage
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which by design extend to all applicable web applications (Nacer, Djebari, Slimani, & Aissani,
2017).
Using Multi-factor Authentication
Multifactor authentication (MFA) is a security protocol that requires more than one
method of authentication from independent categories of credentials to verify the user’s identity
for a login or other transaction. In an MFA scenario, users are initially presented a login screen
to a web-application. Once they successfully enter their credentials, the system requires them to
validate the authentication on another device, typically the user’s mobile phone to complete the
process. The idea behind this safeguard is the reasoning that even if perpetrators know a users’
usernames and passwords, the possibility of their having access to a second device (the mobile
phone in the example) at the same time is remote (Velasquez, Caro, & Rodriguez, 2018).
Using Encryption for Data Transfer and Storage
Data encryption translates data into another form, or code, so that only people with access
to a secret key (formally called a decryption key) or password can read it. Encrypted data are
commonly referred to as ciphertext, and unencrypted data is called plaintext. Currently,
encryption is one of the most popular and effective data security methods used by educational
institutions. Two main types of data encryption exist--asymmetric encryption, also known as
public-key encryption, and symmetric encryption (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015).
User Authorization
Authorization is the process of giving someone access and privileges to specific
components of an information system. In multi-user computer systems, a system administrator
defines for the system which users are allowed what levels of access to the system and what are
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the privileges of use (example file directories, data access etc.). If done effectively and
adequately, authorization can prevent data exposure by restricting access as necessary.
(Information Resources Management Association, 2017).
Procedure-Oriented Safeguards
Implementing a Password Policy for Strong, Complex and Long Passwords
Researchers have shown that strong, long and complex passwords are a big deterrent to
cyber perpetrators as they get exponentially difficult for them to crack them. Some rules for
password complexity may include: creating passwords that are at least 8 characters long and
containing one uppercase letter[A-Z], one lowercase letter[a-z], one numeric character [0-9] and
one special character from the set: ` ! @ $ % ^ & * ( ) - _ = + [ ] ; :. Certain attributes like login
ID, email address, first, or last name are not recommended to be a part of the password (Shen et
al., 2016).
To get an idea about the time it may take for a perpetrator using brute force methods to
crack a password, modern algorithms show that the length plays the biggest role in establishing
complexity. For example, nine-character passwords may take five days to break, 10-character
passwords may take four months, and 11-character passwords may take ten years. If the length is
increased to 12 characters, it may take up to 200 years to crack (Estimating Password Cracking
Times, 2018).
Making Users Change Passwords Frequently
Password breaches may not be detected right after they happen. Often, they are not
discovered until months go by. Having a policy of frequent password changes (at least once in
three months) is a vital safeguard. This is critical for institutions as users often tend to use the
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same password for multiple sites. If a perpetrator can guess a user’s password for one site, the
other applicable sites to which that user has access may also be at risk as the potential for the
password to be the same for multiple sites is relatively high (Woods & Siponen, 2018).
Taking Regular Backups of Key Data
A good backup strategy is essential for data security. A backup is the last line of defense
against data loss, providing a way to restore original data (Groot, 2017). Backups are even more
crucial if they are completed in real-time. This is because restoring from a backup even a day-old
can result in partial data-loss especially for transactions or changes that happened after the last
backup was taken (Cherry, 2015). This is a critical component for business continuity and
disaster recovery protocols, especially for institutions in states like Florida that are prone to
natural disasters and may experience data loss due to them (Torres & Alsharif, 2016).
Implementing Post-intrusion Attempt Remediation Procedures
A data-breach comes with legal implications which force educational institutions to take
additional post-intrusion remediation steps. Some common procedures include informing the
authorities, blocking rogue IP addresses, offering credit monitoring for affected users (Young et
al., 2016).
Applying Critical Server and System Patches Regularly
A patch is a specialized software designed to update a computer program or its
supporting data, to fix or improve it. This includes fixing security vulnerabilities and system
malfunctions, also known as bugs. Thus, such fixes are called bug fixes. Institutions need to
perform this critical step of applying patches and bug fixes on their information systems on a
regular basis to improve their security, usability, and performance (Bourne, 2014).
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People-Oriented Safeguards
Avoid Opening Emails from Unknown Sources
Emails are the primary media for directing users to phishing scam web-sites which are
usually presented as links within the email. Educating the user base on the dangers of phishing
and instructing them to avoid clicking on links in the email unless they are sure of their
authenticity is a critical security measure (Vayansky & Kumar, 2018).
Avoid Opening Attachments to Emails from Unknown Sources
Attachments containing harmful malware and ransomware are often circulated using
emails. Educating users about dangers of such attachments is critical so that they are careful
about ignoring attachments from unknown sources (Sammons & Cross, 2017).
Avoid Visiting Unauthorized Websites on Work Computers
Unauthorized websites may contain hidden viruses that may get downloaded on the
computers from which they are accessed and may subsequently damage institutional data by
propagating through the institutional network. Some institutions enforce safe-use policies for
work machines that prohibit users from visiting such unauthorized and black-listed websites
(Tanaka, Akiyama, & Goto, 2017).
Avoiding Sending Valuable and Confidential Data via Email or Instant Messages
It is important to avoid sending confidential data using emails as messages may get
intercepted in transit or be accidentally delivered to an unauthorized recipient if the email
address is entered incorrectly. In addition, there is no guarantee that the recipients' email
addresses are always accurate or have not been compromised. Thus, sending emails, while not
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being completely sure of their intended destination, might expose such confidential data
(Sammons & Cross, 2017).
Check for Https in Website Addresses That Require Authentication
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is the secure version of HTTP, the
protocol over which data are sent between the users’ browsers and the websites that they are
connected to. The ‘S’ at the end of HTTPS stands for Secure. It means all communications
between the user's browser and the website are encrypted. Thus, checking for the presence of the
https protocol is critical especially for websites that require users to enter credentials to verify
their identity (Virvilis, Mylonas, Tsalis, & Gritzalis, 2015).
Employ a Dedicated Information Security Officer
The Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is a senior-level executive responsible for
developing and implementing an information security program, which includes procedures and
policies designed to protect enterprise communications, systems and assets from both internal
and external threats. Information security is a specialized dynamic area that requires expertise
and training for optimal utility. Those institutions that invest in employing a dedicated CISO
show the commitment to stay ahead of the information security challenge-curve (Hooper &
McKissack, 2016)
Training Users on New Security Threats
The world of security threats changes constantly. New threats are launched regularly. It is
imperative for an institution focused on information security to continually train its users on new
security threats to keep them up to date (Caballero, 2017).
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Frequency of Critical Measures
Implementation of data security measures in institutions is not enough by itself. The
implemented measures need to be repeated at an acceptable frequency for them to remain
effective. Some critical measures applicable to educational institutions are described in this
section. They are classified as high or low frequency measures depending on the number of
repetitions that can be completed within a year (Caballero, 2017).
High Frequency Measures
Measures that need to be repeated multiple times in a year for optimal effectiveness are
classified as high frequency measures (Caballero, 2017). Three measures are discussed in the
following paragraphs: (a) honey pot experiments, (b) social engineering experiments to enforce
security protocols, and (c) log review and monitoring.
A honeypot is a computer system (typically a server on the network) that is set up by
security administrators of an institution to act as a decoy to lure cyber-attackers. This is done by
relaxing security protocols on the server, thereby making it visible and inducing cyber-attackers
to attempt to get into it. No confidential information is stored on that server, but some fake
information may be entered to make the data look authentic. The purpose of such honeypot
experiments is to gain an insight into attempts to gain unauthorized access to information
systems as they apply to that institution so that they can be better prepared to counter them
(Christopher, Choo, & Dehghantanha, 2017).
To ensure that their users are following adequate security protocols, institutions may send
communications like phishing emails on a periodic basis to a cross-section of their user-base to
check the responses. The selection of users identified to receive such emails may initially be
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made at random but later targeted to ensure that repeat offenders or those with a propensity to be
phished are always included. Penalties for clicking on the links in the email include curbing
access to critical services for such users, pending their passing compulsory security classes. For
repeat offenses, their access may be suspended or in more severe cases, the employee may be
terminated (Gardner & Thomas, 2014; Stetson University, 2018).
A breach can be identified much before it is reported to have happened. Any access or
attempts to access an institution’s servers and network are recorded in system and server logs.
Administrators could review and monitor these logs for clues and patterns that may help them
identify potential breaches or intrusion attempts to access the institution’s information systems
(Wang, Liu, Pitsilis, & Zhang, 2018).
Low Frequency Measures
Due to the time and resources involved, some of the critical measures are not costeffective enough to be repeated multiple times a year. Often these measures require the
involvement of outside agencies. They are classified as low-frequency measures (Caballero,
2017) and are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Internal Security Audit
A security audit of an institution's information security infrastructure and policies may be
conducted by the internal audit unit of the institution to identify areas where improvement is
needed. Some institutions have dedicated internal audit teams that conduct such procedures
routinely. Because such audits are completed by employees of the institution, there are no extra
costs associated with the process, and there is no additional risk of institutional data being
exposed to a third-party (Steinbart, Raschke, Gal, & Dilla, 2012). Some higher education
56

institutions often allow students enrolled in a computer security class at the institution to perform
an internal security audit for the institution as a part of their coursework (Stetson University,
2018).
External security Audit
A security audit of an institution's information security infrastructure and policies may be
conducted by an external independent agency to rectify shortcomings and identify areas of
improvement. These audits are typically carried out by experts in their fields. Consequently,
there is a significant cost associated with this process. Specialized tools and software are often
used for external audits. Because they are conducted by people outside the institution, internal
biases are avoided (Kovacich & Halibozek, 2017).
Review of Institutional Security Policies and Change Management Policies
Information security is a dynamic field. As security threats change and become more
sophisticated, an institution's security policies and change management policies also need to
change to keep up. Therefore, institutional security policies and change management policies
need to be reviewed periodically to ensure that they are updated with the necessary changes (Adi,
Hamza, & Pene, 2018).
Attendance of Information Technology Personnel at Information Security Classes
Staff working in information security areas can be more productive and efficient if they
can enhance their skills and knowledge by attending information security classes. Some of these
classes prepare security personnel with the concepts of ethical hacking that allow them to
enhance their skills in tackling security threats more efficiently (Caballero, 2017).
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Mandatory Training on Security Topics for all Employees
Threats to information security change constantly. Adequate training on a regular basis
can keep institutional staff updated about the latest threats and applicable safeguards so that they
can implement those in practice. There is never a substitute for relevant training. An institution
that regularly trains its staff, especially on security aspects, is usually well-prepared to tackle the
ever-changing security threats. If such trainings are made mandatory and routinely enforced, an
institution can ensure that none of its staff are left behind in any area related to threats and
safeguards (Caldwell, 2016)
Review of Data Breach Remediation Procedures
Breach remediation procedures that include cyber insurance policies, post-breach actions
need to be reviewed by the institutions periodically to keep them up to date (Young et al., 2016).
Review of Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Policies
Data breaches, unauthorized access, malware or natural disasters can affect an
institution's business continuity. In cases of technical or natural disasters, an institution needs to
have plans in place to recover from any disruption of service quickly and resume normal
operations efficiently. These business continuity and disaster recovery plans need to be reviewed
periodically to ensure accuracy, reliability, and adaptability (Snedaker & Rima, 2014).
Review of Data Backup Policies
An efficient data backup policy is essential for data security. A backup is the last defense
against data loss, providing a way to restore original data. This data policy is expected to be
reviewed periodically to ensure that data are backed up optimally while considering advanced
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methods of data backup to enhance efficiency in creating backups and restoring from them
(Cherry, 2015).
Budget Allocations for Information Security
In recent years, especially after the economic downturn towards the end of the last
decade, almost all states in the United States had to endure budget cuts, especially in the field of
education (Serneels, Beegle, & Dillon, 2017). This, in turn, has negatively impacted the ability of
educational institutions to implement sophisticated information security related initiatives.
Budgets allocated for information security in educational institutions form a part of the total
budget for information technology initiatives which experienced cuts due to the overall
budgetary situation of education in general. Private institutions that did not typically rely on state
funding, but were instead funded by revenue generated from enrollments, were also negatively
impacted due to the economic downturn which caused lower enrollments in such institutions
(Urquiola, 2016). However, with the relative stabilization of the economy in recent years,
enrollments in private institutions have increased (Serneels et al., 2017).
Information technology (IT) budgets are typically allocated as a function of the total
operating budget of an institution which, in turn, is related to its revenue and size. Interestingly,
the allocation of funds for information technology has been higher for smaller institutions.
According to a recent 2018 publication, the average small institution (less than $50 million in
revenue) spends 6.9% of their revenue on IT; Mid-sized institutions (between $50 million – $2
billion) spend 4.1%, while larger institutions (over $2 billion) spend a relatively tiny 3.2%. The
relatively smaller allocation in larger institutions is probably related to economies of scale
obtained from operational efficiencies (How Much Should a Company Spend on IT?/Business
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Guide, 2018). Institutions spend on an average 5.6% of the overall IT budget on information
security and risk management with a range of 1% to 13% (Gartner Says Many Organizations
Falsely Equate IT Security Spending with Maturity, 2016).
In recent years, a majority of proposed and enacted budget proposals at both the state and
federal levels have curtailed budgets allocated for the fields of education. Technology and
personnel budgets have thus been impacted across most educational institutions. Although some
premier higher education institutions have used donor, endowment and grant money to power
technology initiatives, the impact on state run public schools due to the budget cuts has been the
most significant (Kelly & Rohland, 2017). Often, schools have no dedicated full-time personnel
allocated for information technology and security areas. Those who oversee those areas have
other responsibilities as well. In a specialized area such as information security, a lack of
specialization has had detrimental effects (Fay & Patterson, 2018).
Critical issues like teacher shortages and school closures have affected education at its
very core. Areas like information security, although serious, have not historically ranked very
high in the list of priorities for educational institutions and are facing continuous challenges. In
such an environment, keeping up with constant changes in the field of information security for
educational institutions dealing with budget cuts has been increasingly difficult (Furnell et al.,
2017).
Summary
Information security is a dynamic concept. Threat mitigation mechanisms that were
prevalent and effective in the past may not be valid today as the threats themselves constantly
change. To keep up in this dynamic environment, educational institutions need to constantly
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evaluate their existing security practices and make necessary enhancements as needed to protect
their confidential information, which includes the personal identity information (PII) of their
users. Adequate infrastructure, personnel, and budgetary support are necessary for educational
institutions to achieve this objective, but they lag behind industrial enterprises in this regard.
Moreover, infrastructure, personnel, and budgetary differences may exist between the types of
educational institutions. A review of relevant literature pertaining to information security in
educational institutions showed a dearth of research pertaining to the preparedness of educational
institutions to handle data security threats and any associated research comparing information
security practices and preparedness across different types of educational institutions. Thus, this
chapter focused on research of attributes necessary to conduct such a comparative analysis of
different types of educational institutions with respect to their information security preparedness.
The information obtained was instrumental in designing the Information Security Preparedness
Instrument (ISPI©) that was created and used exclusively for this study.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The primary goal of this study was to investigate the research questions that relate to the
preparedness of educational institutions toward ensuring the security of their institutional
information as stated in Chapter 1. A survey instrument titled Information Security Preparedness
Instrument (ISPI©) was created exclusively for this study by the researcher. An online survey
tool named Qualtrics was used to distribute the survey instrument and obtain the data for the
study. The methodology used to investigate the research questions is presented in this chapter
which has been organized into five sections: (a) research questions, (b) selection of participants,
(c) instrumentation, (d) data collection and, (e) data analysis.
Research Questions
The following research questions were used to guide this study:
1. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security
among educational institutions with respect to identification and classification
of threats, and how do results vary across the types of institutions?
This question was further divided into five sub-questions based on the five
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015):
1.1.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
hardware-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?
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1.2.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
software-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.3.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
data-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.4.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
procedure-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.5.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
people-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

2. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security
among educational institutions with respect to institutional safeguards,
frequency of critical measures and security policy updates, and budgetary
allocation, and how do results vary across the types of institutions?
This question was further divided into eight sub-questions based on the five
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015), frequency of critical
measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocation:
2.1.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
hardware-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?
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2.2.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
software-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.3.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
data-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.4.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
procedure-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.5.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
people-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.6

What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of
high-frequency critical practices among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.7.

What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of
low-frequency critical practices and security policy updates among the
different types of educational institutions?

2.8.

What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to
information security among the different types of educational
institutions?
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3. What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational
institutions with respect to information security, and how do results vary
across the types of institutions?
Selection of Participants
The population of interest for this study consisted of a cross-sectional representation of
the following types of educational institutions in the state of Florida: public and private PK-12
institutions, public and private universities, and virtual schools. Because the threat to institutional
data applies to all educational institutions, a representation of different types of educational
institutions was necessary for an accurate analysis, as they are subjected to different levels of
constraints with respect to ensuring information security.
The information systems in PK-12 Public Schools in Florida are managed at the schooldistrict level. There are 67 school districts in Florida, one for each county. Each of the 67 school
districts operate virtual schools (Virtual Education, 2018). In addition, there is a state-run Florida
Virtual School along with several virtual schools both tuition free and private that are not
operated by the state (Online Learning with a K12 Education, 2018). There are also 3,072 PK-12
Private Schools that operate in Florida (Private School Directory, 2018). Finally, there are 85
Public Colleges/Universities and 57 Private Colleges/Universities in the state (Florida Colleges
and Universities – Colleges Search by State/Cappex, 2018).
The criterion for selection of the participant institutions for the study was the online
availability of contact information of their respective heads of information technology. The
contact information for the heads of information technology for PK-12 Public Schools was
available online for all 67 school districts. Similarly, the contact information for the heads of
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information technology for PK-12 Virtual Schools was available online for all 67 school
districts, the Florida Virtual School, and two non-state-run virtual schools, thereby totaling 70
virtual schools. The numbers of PK-12 Private Schools, Public Colleges/Universities, and Private
Colleges/Universities for which the contact information for the heads of information technology
was available online were 20, 30, and 30 respectively. Thus, using a method of criterion-based
purposive sampling, a total of 218 institutions were chosen for the study.
A researcher-created survey, Information Security Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©), was
used for this study. Emails containing a link to this researcher-created survey were sent in March
2018 to the respective heads of information technology at the 218 selected educational
institutions.
Data Collection
Approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of
Central Florida. The approval can be seen in Appendix A. The data for this study were obtained
from the respondents using a survey instrument titled Information Security Preparedness
Instrument (ISPI©) which was based on the Qualtrix Survey tool and created exclusively for this
study by the researcher (See Appendix B). This 68-question online survey was designed to take
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. Given the nature of the questions involved regarding
institutional information security and to protect the confidentiality of the respondents, the survey
was designed to be anonymous. The researcher provided all respondents involved in the study
with an informed consent form (Appendix D), which includes a clause stating that the participant
can withdraw from the study at any time. The consent form was added as an attachment to the
email that was sent to the respondents. The email briefly explained the research study being
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conducted and provided the respondent with a choice to participate and a link to access the webbased ISPI© instrument. Prior to beginning the instrument, the respondents were asked to
confirm their consent to take part in this study. They had to agree to participate in the ISPI©
instrument before being able to begin.
Web-based surveys are a convenient and popular method of data collection, especially if
they are directed toward an internet-savvy population. However, a “survey-overload” is often
created as many research initiatives and other data collection initiatives use this method.
Consequently, the response rate for such surveys has declined over the years (Morton et al,
2012). Nulty (2008) in comparing response rates to online surveys showed that they can range
anywhere from 20% to 47%. Another publication indicated that web-based response rates for
surveys are usually around 42% (Dilman, Smyth & Christian, 2014). Bennett and Nair (2009)
contended, however, that there is no magic formula by which a response rate can be identified as
“acceptable.” Furthermore, there is no evidence that online surveys with lower response rates
produce biased evaluations (Layne, DeCristoforo, & McGinty, 1999; Porter, 2004). Although a
higher response rate is certainly desirable, valid and reliable results have been generated from
online surveys with low response rates of 30% (Bennett & Nair, 2009).
This study was exploratory in nature. The selected sample was not expected to be
representative of the population of interest, and thus findings were not immediately
generalizable, though some cautious generalizations were inferred and are presented. The
researcher was attentive to recommended minimums to achieve a reliable and valid result and
attempted to obtain a survey response rate of at least 42% (Dilman et al., 2014).
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The initial email to the respondents was sent on March 7, 2018. The survey was available
to complete from March 7, 2018 through March 31, 2018. Two follow-up emails were sent prior
to the survey closing date to remind respondents to complete it. Of the 218 institutional
respondents who were contacted, 93 responded. Thus, the survey had an overall response rate of
42.66%.
Data Analysis
Data Analysis for Research Question 1
To answer Research Question 1, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI©
instrument their perceptions of the security risks associated with all recognized threats on a scale
of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5 being the riskiest as they applied to their respective
institutions. The data obtained for the threats was aggregated to the level of the five factors of
information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was
calculated for individual items within each of the five factor groups). The association of the
selected security threats and the five factors of information systems is shown in Table 2. Any
given security risk may be associated with more than one information security factors. However,
for this study, any given risk was classified only under one factor based on the one on which it
had the maximum impact.
Responses from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was
calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the different types of
institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to
ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and at the type of institution level. Five
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separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat perceptions across the
different types of educational institutions, one for each dependent variable. The dependent
variables were the security threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information
systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedure) and the independent variable was the
institution type.

Table 2
Association of Security Risks with Five Factors of Information Systems
Risk
Ransomware
Cyber – espionage
Phishing
Sniffing
Hacking
Denial of service
Natural disasters
Theft
Improper disposal
Malicious insider
Spoofing
Malware
SQL injection
Web application attacks
Payment card skimmers
Weak passwords
Elevation of privilege
User errors
Unpatched systems
Institutional data on personal devices
Unencrypted data transfers
Institutional data on third party services
Outdated anti-virus and anti-malware software
Inadequate security monitoring
Inadequate backups of institutional data

Factor
Software
Data
People
Hardware
Procedure
Procedure
Hardware
Hardware
People
People
Procedure
Software
Software
Software
Hardware
People
Procedure
People
Data
Data
Data
Data
Software
Procedure
Procedure
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Data Analysis for Research Question 2
To answer Research Question 2, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI©
instrument their perceptions of the effectiveness of recognized security threat prevention
measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective and 5 being the most effective as they
applied to their respective institutions. Thereafter, they were asked to indicate on the ISPI©
instrument the time intervals at which their respective institutions performed critical security
practices and reviewed their specific security policies. Finally, the focus shifted to ascertaining
the institutional cultures in acknowledging the threats to data and implementing measures to
prevent breaches. Respondents were asked to answer questions on the ISPI© instrument about
their institutional allocation of operational and personnel budgetary funds, and the reporting lines
of the head of information technology for this purpose.
The data obtained for the threat prevention measures were aggregated to the level of the
five factors of information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the
group mean was calculated for individual items within each of the five factor groups). The
association of the selected threat prevention measures and the five factors of information systems
is shown in Table 3. Any given security risk may be associated with more than one information
security factor. However, for this study, only the primary factor was associated.
Responses from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was
calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the different types of
institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to
ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and at the type of institution level. Five
separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat prevention measures
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across the different types of educational institutions, one for each dependent variable. The
dependent variables were the threat prevention measures aggregated to the level of the five
factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedures) and the
independent variable was the institution type.

Table 3
Association of Threat Prevention Measures with Five Factors of Information Systems
Risk

Factor

Instructing users to not click on links in emails from unknown
sources

People

Instructing users to not open attachments from emails from
unknown sources

People

Instructing users to avoid visiting unauthorized websites on
work computers

People

Implementing a password policy for strong, complex and long
passwords for all users

Procedure

Making users change passwords frequently

Procedure

Avoiding sending valuable and confidential data via email or
instant messages

People

Instructing users to check for https in any website address that
require authentication

People

Removing stored personal identifying information from
computers and mobile devices

Hardware

Clearing browsing history, temporary files and cookies from
public computers

Software

Regularly updating anti-virus and anti-malware software on all
institutional machines

Software

Taking regular backups of key data

Procedure

Using central authentication and single sign on

Data
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Risk

Factor

Using multi-factor authentication

Data

Using encryption for data transfer and storage

Data

Using biometric authentication for accessing secure areas

Hardware

User authorization

Data

Employing a dedicated Information Security Officer

People

Installing institutional firewall

Software

Installing institutional virtual private network

Software

Training users on new security threats

People

Implementing post-intrusion attempt remediation procedures

Procedure

Applying critical server and system patches regularly

Procedure

The responses about frequencies of critical security practices and security policy updates
were first differentiated between high frequency and low frequency based on their relative
frequency of occurrence. Practices that are typically undertaken multiple times a year were
classified as high frequency practices and those that were performed yearly or less frequently
were classified as low frequency practices. These practices are listed in Table 4. The responses
were then grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The data were analyzed using descriptive
statistics and two ANOVA procedures, one each for high frequency and low frequency practices
to ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. For the ANOVA procedures,
the dependent variables were the frequencies of critical security practices and security policy
updates and the independent variable was the institution type.
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Table 4
Typical Frequencies of Critical Security Practices
Measure
Honey pot experiments
Social engineering experiments to enforce security protocols
Log review and monitoring
Internal security audit
External security audit
Review of institutional security policies and change
management
Sending information technology personnel to attend
information security classes
Mandatory training on security topics for all employees
Review of data breach remediation procedures
Review of business continuity and disaster recovery policies
Review of data backup policies

Frequency
High
High
High
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low

Note. High = Multiple times a year, Low = Yearly or less frequent

Finally, the responses obtained from similar institutions for the budget allocation metrics
were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The budget allocation metrics are listed in
Table 5. The analysis of the data was completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the
overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to
compare budget allocations for information security across the different types of educational
institutions. The dependent variable was the budget allocations and the independent variable was
the institution type.
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Table 5
Budget Allocation Metrics
Budget Measure
Percentage of Annual Operating Budget allocated to Information
Technology (IT)
Less than 3%
3% to 10%
10% to 15%
Greater than 15%

Score

1
2
3
4

Percentage of IT Budget allocated to Information Security
Less than 3%
3% to 10%
10% to 15%
Greater than 15%

1
2
3
4

Dollar Amount of IT Budget per Employee
Less than $5,000
$5,000 to $10,000
$10,000 to $20,000
Greater than $20,000

1
2
3
4

Data Analysis for Research Question 3
To answer Research Question 3, respondents were asked to rank their overall information
security preparedness on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least prepared and 5 being the most
prepared. The responses obtained from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group
mean was calculated by institution type to obtain response profiles for the different types of
institutions). The analysis of the data was completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the
overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to
compare the overall security preparation scores across the different types of educational
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institutions. The dependent variable was the self-reported information security preparedness
level and the independent variable was the institution type.

Ancillary Data Analyses
Additional analyses were conducted to further analyze the initial findings related to the
research questions and to establish identifiable patterns, if any, within the scope of the study.
These analyses included a correlation analysis and a N/A response analysis.
The correlation analysis was conducted using the responses obtained in the ISPI© to
investigate how each of the mean scores of security threat risk perception factors, threat
prevention measure effectiveness perception factors, frequency of key security practices, and
budget allocations correlated with the overall preparedness scores for each educational institution
who participated in the survey. The purpose of this analysis was to further investigate the factors
to determine which had the most impact on the overall institutional threat preparedness.
Respondents of the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey, be it
a security threat risk perception score, threat prevention measure effectiveness perception score,
or a frequency of a key security measure. An N/A response meant that the item concerned did
not apply to the institution concerned. In other words, the institution concerned did not
implement the item concerned as a threat prevention measure or did not consider the item
concerned as a significant risk. An analysis was completed to identify the 10 items on the ISPI©
that had the most N/A responses and how such N/A responses were distributed across the
different types of educational institutions. The averages of the percentage distributions of the
identified N/A response items were then calculated for each type of educational institution. The

75

purpose of this analysis was to help identify how the N/A responses were distributed across the
types of educational institutions which, in turn, helped identify the types of educational
institutions that were failing to implement key security measures the most.
Summary
The methods used to conduct this study have been presented in this chapter. The purpose
of the study and the research questions were restated. The selection of participants,
instrumentation, data collection, and data analysis were also presented. Results of the data
analysis are presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Introduction
This exploratory study was conducted to analyze the preparedness of educational
institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing their self-reported
perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding risk-mitigating practices.
Factors that were studied with reference to securing institutional data were aligned with the five
components of any information system (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware, software, data,
procedures, and people. The researcher examined the security threats and the critical measures
associated with these factors that can enhance security within the constraints applicable to
educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of the threats to information security, the
researcher further explored the frequencies with which the different types of educational
institutions undertake critical security practices and stay up-to-date in their information security
policies and procedures. Finally, the culture of educational institutions with respect to
implementing information security measures as reflected in their allocation of budgets for the
same was explored. This chapter presents the data for the three research questions and is divided
into three sections: (a) Data Collection Response Details, (b) Results, and (c) Summary.
Data Collection Response Details
A researcher-created survey named Information Security Preparedness Instrument
(ISPI©) was used in this study. Emails containing a link to this researcher-created survey were
sent on March 7, 2018 to individuals overseeing information security at 218 educational
institutions. Institutions included 20 PK-12 Private Schools, 30 Public Colleges or Universities,
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30 Private Colleges or Universities, the Florida Virtual School, 70 PK-12 Virtual Schools, and
all 67 PK-12 Public School districts. The survey remained open through March 31, 2018. A total
of 93 responses were received, 31 of which were from PK-12 Public Schools, 10 were from PK12 Private Schools, 17 were from PK-12 Virtual Schools, 20 were from Public Colleges or
Universities and 15 were from Private Colleges or Universities. The response rate was the
highest for Public Colleges or Universities at 66.66% and was the lowest for PK-12 Virtual
Schools at 24.28%. The overall response rate was 42.66%.
Results
Research Question 1
What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among educational
institutions with respect to identification and classification of threats, and how do results vary
across the types of institutions?
The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to ascertain
the overall response profiles at the factor level and at the type of institution level. Five separate
one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat perceptions across the different
types of educational institutions, one for each dependent variable. The dependent variables were
the security threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems (hardware,
software, data, people, and procedures), and the independent variable was the institution type.
The research question was further divided into five sub-questions, one for each dependent
variable. The analyses to respond to the five sub-questions for Research Question 1 are presented
in the sections.
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Research Question 1.1. Hardware-Oriented Threats
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for hardware-oriented threats
among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 6. The respondents rated their perceptions
of security risks for hardware-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for hardware-oriented threats across all types of
educational institutions was 3.52. PK-12 Public Schools had the highest mean risk score of 3.62
and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.10. The risk score varied the
most among PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.71
and varied the least among Public Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.45.

Table 6
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Hardware-Oriented Threats by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.62

0.71

[3.36, 3.88]

1.25

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

3.10

0.61

[2.66, 3.54]

2.25

3.75

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.69

0.71

[3.33, 4.06]

2.00

5.00

Public College/University

20

3.43

0.45

[3.21, 3.64]

2.50

4.25

Private College/University

15

3.52

0.41

[3.29, 3.74]

2.75

4.00

Total

93

3.52

0.62

[3.39, 3.65]

1.25

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perception of
hardware-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 7). The results from the analysis
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions
with respect to hardware-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.85, p =
0.13].
Table 7
ANOVA: Perceptions of Hardware-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

2.76

4

0.69

1.85

0.13

Within Groups

32.74

88

0.37

Total

35.50

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

Research Question 1.2. Software-Oriented Threats
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for software-oriented threats
among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 8. The respondents rated their perceptions
of security risks for software-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being the least risky and 5
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for software-oriented threats across all types of
educational institutions was 3.56. PK-12 Virtual Schools had the highest mean risk score of 3.69,
and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.28. The risk score varied the
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most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.64 and varied the least among
Private Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.42.

Table 8
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Software-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.63

0.53

[3.43, 3.82]

2.80

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

3.28

0.54

[2.89, 3.66]

2.40

4.00

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.69

0.64

[3.36, 4.02]

2.60

5.00

Public College/University

20

3.45

0.50

[3.21, 3.68]

2.40

4.20

Private College/University

15

3.63

0.42

[3.39, 3.85]

3.00

4.40

Total

93

3.56

0.54

[3.45, 3.67]

2.40

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
software-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 9). The results from the analysis
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions
with respect to software-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.35, p =
0.26].
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Table 9
ANOVA: Perceptions of Software-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

1.53

4

0.38

1.35

0.26

Within Groups

24.94

88

0.28

Total

26.48

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

Research Question 1.3. Data-Oriented Threats
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for data-oriented threats among
the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 10. The respondents rated their perceptions
of security risks for data-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for data-oriented threats across all types of educational
institutions was 3.79. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean risk score of 3.89, and
PK-12 Public Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.74. The risk score varied the most
among PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 0.66 and varied the least among
Private Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.38.
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Data-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.74

0.66

[3.50, 3.98]

1.80

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

3.86

0.57

[3.44, 4.27]

2.40

4.40

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.80

0.64

[3.47, 4.12]

2.20

5.00

Public College/University

20

3.76

0.40

[3.57, 3.94]

2.60

4.40

Private College/University

15

3.89

0.38

[3.68, 4.10]

3.40

4.80

Total

93

3.79

0.55

[3.68, 3.90]

1.80

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of dataoriented threats among institutional types (see Table 11). The results of the analysis revealed that
there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions with respect to
data-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 0.24, p = 0.92].

Table 11
ANOVA: Perceptions of Data-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

0.30

4

0.08

0.24

0.92

Within Groups

27.58

88

0.31

Total

27.88

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square
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Research Question 1.4. Procedure-Oriented Threats
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for procedure-oriented threats
among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 12. The respondents rated their perceptions
of security risks for procedure-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for procedure-oriented threats across all types of
educational institutions was 3.67. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean risk score
of 3.78 and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.45. The risk score varied
the most among PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 0.76 and varied the least
among Private Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.27.

Table 12
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.68

0.76

[3.40, 3.96]

1.25

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

3.45

0.50

[3.09, 3.80]

2.50

4.00

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.76

0.58

[3.45, 4.05]

2.67

5.00

Public College/University

20

3.60

0.38

[3.42, 3.77]

2.67

4.00

Private College/University

15

3.78

0.27

[3.62, 3.92]

3.17

4.17

Total

93

3.67

0.57

[3.55, 3.78]

1.25

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
procedure-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 13). The results from the analysis
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions
with respect to procedure-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 0.68, p =
0.61].

Table 13
ANOVA: Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

0.89

4

0.22

0.68

0.61

Within Groups

28.77

88

0.33

Total

29.66

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

Research Question 1.5. People-Oriented Threats
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for people-oriented threats
among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 14. The respondents rated their perceptions
of security risks for people-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for people-oriented threats across all types of educational
institutions was 3.80. PK-12 Virtual Schools had the highest mean risk score of 3.99, and PK-12
Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.54. The risk score varied the most among
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PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 0.58 and varied the least among Private
Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.31.

Table 14
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of People-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.76

0.58

[3.55, 3.97]

2.20

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

3.54

0.47

[3.20, 3.87]

2.60

4.20

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.99

0.53

[3.71, 4.26]

3.00

5.00

Public College/University

20

3.79

0.35

[3.62, 3.95]

3.20

4.40

Private College/University

15

3.83

0.31

[3.65, 3.99]

3.40

4.20

Total

93

3.80

0.48

[3.69, 3.89]

2.20

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
people-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 15). The results from the analysis
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions
with respect to people-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.46, p =
0.22].
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Table 15
ANOVA: Perceptions of People-oriented Threats by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

1.34

4

0.33

1.46

0.22

Within Groups

20.10

88

0.23

Total

21.44

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

Research Question 2
What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among educational
institutions with respect to institutional safeguards, frequency of critical practices and security
policy updates, and budgetary allocation, and how do results vary across the types of
institutions?
The analysis of the data collected for threat prevention measures was a combination of
descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and at the type of
institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat
prevention measures across the different types of educational institutions, one for each dependent
variable. The dependent variables were the threat prevention measures aggregated to the level of
the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedures) and
the independent variable was the institution type.
The data for frequency of key security practices were analyzed using descriptive statistics
and two separate one-way ANOVA procedures, one each for high frequency and low frequency
practices to ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. For both the ANOVA
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procedures, the dependent variables were the frequencies of critical security practices and
security policy updates; and the independent variable was the institution type.
The analysis of the data collected for budget allocation was completed using descriptive
statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA
procedure was conducted to compare budget allocations for information security across the
different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the budget allocations,
and the independent variable was the institution type.
The research question was further divided into eight sub-questions, one for each
dependent variable. The analyses to respond to the eight sub-questions for Research Question 2
are presented in this section.
Research Question 2.1. Hardware-Oriented Measures
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of hardware-oriented
security measures among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 16. The respondents rated their perceptions
of effectiveness for hardware-oriented security measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least
effective and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for hardware-oriented
measures across all types of educational institutions was 3.19. Private Colleges/Universities had
the highest mean effectiveness score of 3.80, and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean
effectiveness score of 2.85. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK-12 Virtual
Schools with a standard deviation of 1.00 and varied the least among Private
Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.53.
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Table 16
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Hardware-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.03

0.71

[2.77, 3.29]

1.00

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

2.85

0.58

[2.43, 3.26]

2.00

4.00

PK-12 Virtual School

16

2.94

1.00

[2.40, 3.46]

1.00

5.00

Public College/University

20

3.35

0.65

[3.04, 3.65]

2.00

5.00

Private College/University

15

3.80

0.53

[3.50, 4.09]

3.00

4.50

Total

92

3.19

0.77

[3.03, 3.34]

1.00

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
effectiveness of hardware-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 17). The
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of
institutions with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of hardware-oriented measures at the
p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 4.38, p = 0.00].
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Table 17
ANOVA: Perceptions of Hardware-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

9.04

4

2.26

4.38

0.00

Within Groups

44.88

87

0.52

Total

53.92

91

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of hardware-oriented measures
(see Table 18). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Public Schools, Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12
Private Schools, and Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools.
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Table 18
Tukey HSD Post-hoc Test of Scores of Hardware-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution

MD

SE

Sig

95% CI

PK-12 Public School

PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.18
0.09
-0.32
-0.77

0.26
0.22
0.21
0.23

0.96 [-0.54, 0.90]
0.99 [-0.52, 0.71]
0.54 [-0.89, 0.25]
0.01 [-1.39, -0.13]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.18
-0.09
-0.50
-0.95

0.26
0.29
0.28
0.29

0.96 [-0.90, 0.54]
1.00 [-0.89, 0.71]
0.38 [-1.27, 0.27]
0.01 [-1.76, -0.13]

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.09
0.09
-0.41
-0.86

0.22
0.29
0.24
0.26

0.99 [-0.71, 0.52]
1.00 [-0.71, 0.89]
0.43 [-1.08, 0.25]
0.01 [-1.58, -0.14]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

0.32
0.50
0.41
-0.45

0.21
0.28
0.24
0.25

0.54
0.38
0.43
0.36

[-0.25, 0.89]
[-0.27, 1.27]
[-0.25, 1.08]
[-1.13, 0.23]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

0.77
0.95
0.86
0.45

0.23
0.29
0.26
0.25

0.01
0.01
0.01
0.36

[0.13, 1.39]
[0.13, 1.76]
[0.14, 1.58]
[-0.23, 1.13]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval

Research Question 2.2. Software-Oriented Measures
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of software-oriented security
measures among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 19. The respondents rated their perceptions
of effectiveness for software-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective
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and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for software-oriented measures
across all types of educational institutions was 3.43. Public Colleges/Universities had the highest
mean effectiveness score of 3.63, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean effectiveness
score of 3.11. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a
standard deviation of 0.69 and varied the least among Private Colleges/Universities with a
standard deviation of 0.40.

Table 19
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Software-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.42

0.41

[3.26, 3.56]

2.67

4.25

PK-12 Private School

10

3.33

0.47

[2.98, 3.66]

2.75

4.25

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.11

0.69

[2.75, 3.46]

1.00

4.00

Public College/University

20

3.63

0.41

[3.43, 3.81]

3.00

5.00

Private College/University

15

3.62

0.40

[3.39, 3.83]

2.50

4.00

Total

93

3.43

0.50

[3.32, 3.53]

1.00

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
effectiveness of software-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 20). The results
from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions
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with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of software-oriented measures at the p < 0.05
level [F(4, 88) = 3.47, p = 0.01].

Table 20
ANOVA: Perceptions of Software-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

3.17

4

0.79

3.47

0.01

Within Groups

20.06

88

0.23

Total

23.22

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of software-oriented measures
(see Table 21). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools and between Public Colleges/Universities and
PK-12 Virtual Schools.

93

Table 21
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Software-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

MD
0.09
0.31
-0.21
-0.20

SE
0.17
0.14
0.14
0.15

Sig
0.98
0.21
0.55
0.67

95% CI
[-0.39, 0.57]
[-0.09, 0.71]
[-0.58, 0.17]
[-0.61, 0.21]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.09
0.22
-0.30
-0.29

0.17
0.19
0.18
0.19

0.98
0.78
0.49
0.57

[-0.57, 0.39]
[-0.31, 0.74]
[-0.81, 0.21]
[-0.83, 0.25]

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.31
-0.22
-0.52
-0.51

0.14
0.19
0.16
0.17

0.21 [-0.71, 0.09]
0.78 [-0.74, 0.31]
0.01 [-0.95, -0.07]
0.03 [-0.98, -0.03]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

0.21
0.30
0.52
0.01

0.14
0.18
0.16
0.16

0.55
0.49
0.01
1.00

[-0.17, 0.58]
[-0.21, 0.81]
[0.07, 0.95]
[-0.44, 0.46]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

0.20
0.29
0.51
-0.01

0.15
0.19
0.17
0.16

0.67
0.57
0.03
1.00

[-0.21, 0.61]
[-0.25, 0.83]
[0.03, 0.98]
[-0.46, 0.44]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval

Research Question 2.3. Data-Oriented Measures
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of data-oriented security
measures among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 22. The respondents rated their perceptions
of effectiveness for data-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective and
5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for data-oriented measures across all
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types of educational institutions was 4.01. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean
effectiveness score of 4.39, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean effectiveness score
of 3.55. The effectiveness scores varied the most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard
deviation of 1.06 and varied the least among Private Colleges/Universities with a standard
deviation of 0.34.

Table 22
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Data-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.84

0.62

[3.60, 4.06]

3.00

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

3.98

0.56

[3.57, 4.37]

2.50

4.67

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.55

1.06

[3.00, 4.10]

1.00

5.00

Public College/University

20

4.38

0.40

[4.19, 4.57]

3.67

5.00

Private College/University

15

4.39

0.34

[4.20, 4.57]

3.75

4.75

Total

93

4.01

0.71

[3.86, 4.15]

1.00

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
effectiveness of data-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 23). The results
from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions
with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of data-oriented measures at the p < 0.05 level
[F(4, 88) = 5.59, p = 0.00].
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Table 23
ANOVA: Perceptions of Data-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

9.42

4

2.36

5.59

0.00

Within Groups

37.06

88

0.42

Total

46.48

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of data-oriented measures (see
Table 24). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools, between Public Colleges/Universities and PK12 Virtual Schools, and between PK-12 Public Schools and Public Colleges/Universities.
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Table 24
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Data-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution

MD

SE

Sig

95% CI

PK-12 Public School

PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.14
0.28
-0.55
-0.55

0.24
0.20
0.19
0.20

0.98 [-0.79, 0.51]
0.60 [-0.26, 0.82]
0.03 [-1.06, -0.02]
0.06 [-1.12, 0.01]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.14
0.42
-0.41
-0.41

0.24
0.26
0.25
0.26

0.98
0.48
0.49
0.53

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.28
-0.42
-0.83
-0.83

0.20
0.26
0.21
0.23

0.60 [-0.82, 0.26]
0.48 [-1.14, 0.29]
0.00 [-1.42, -0.23]
0.00 [-1.47, -0.19]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

0.55
0.41
0.83
-0.01

0.19
0.25
0.21
0.22

0.03
0.49
0.00
1.00

[0.02, 1.06]
[-0.29, 1.10]
[0.23, 1.42]
[-0.62, 0.61]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

0.55
0.41
0.83
0.01

0.20
0.26
0.23
0.22

0.06
0.53
0.00
1.00

[-0.01, 1.12]
[-0.32, 1.15]
[0.19, 1.47]
[-0.61, 0.62]

[-0.51, 0.79]
[-0.29, 1.14]
[-1.10, 0.29]
[-1.15, 0.32]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval

Research Question 2.4. Procedure-oriented Measures
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of procedure-oriented
security measures among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 25. The respondents rated their perceptions
of effectiveness for procedure-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective
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and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for procedure-oriented measures
across all types of educational institutions was 3.70. Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12
Private Schools had the highest mean effectiveness score of 3.96, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had
the lowest mean effectiveness score of 3.41. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.82 and varied the least among Public
Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.33.

Table 25
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

3.61

0.42

[3.45, 3.76]

3.00

4.40

PK-12 Private School

10

3.96

0.44

[3.64, 4.27]

3.40

5.00

PK-12 Virtual School

17

3.41

0.82

[2.99, 3.83]

1.00

4.40

Public College/University

20

3.77

0.33

[3.61, 3.92]

3.00

4.40

Private College/University

15

3.96

0.44

[3.71, 4.20]

3.40

4.80

Total

93

3.70

0.53

[3.59, 3.81]

1.00

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
effectiveness of procedure-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 26). The
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of
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institutions with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of procedure-oriented measures at the
p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 3.37, p = 0.01].

Table 26
ANOVA: Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

3.45

4

0.86

3.37

0.01

Within Groups

22.57

88

0.26

Total

26.03

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of procedure-oriented measures
(see Table 27). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools.
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Table 27
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Procedure-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution

MD

SE

Sig

95% CI

PK-12 Public School

PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.35
0.20
-0.16
-0.35

0.18
0.15
0.15
0.16

0.32
0.70
0.80
0.19

[-0.86, 0.16]
[-0.22, 0.62]
[-0.56, 0.24]
[-0.79, 0.09]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.35
0.55
0.19
0.00

0.18
0.20
0.20
0.21

0.32
0.06
0.87
1.00

[-0.16, 0.86]
[-0.01, 1.11]
[-0.35, 0.73]
[-0.57, 0.57]

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.20
-0.55
-0.36
-0.55

0.15
0.20
0.17
0.18

0.70 [-0.62, 0.22]
0.06 [-1.11, 0.01]
0.21 [-0.82, 0.10]
0.02 [-1.04, -0.04]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

0.16
-0.19
0.36
-0.19

0.15
0.20
0.17
0.17

0.80
0.87
0.21
0.81

[-0.24, 0.56]
[-0.73, 0.35]
[-0.10, 0.82]
[-0.67, 0.29]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

0.35
0.00
0.55
0.19

0.16
0.21
0.18
0.17

0.19
1.00
0.02
0.81

[-0.09, 0.79]
[-0.57, 0.57]
[0.04, 1.04]
[-0.29, 0.67]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval

Research Question 2.5. People-Oriented Measures
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of people-oriented security
measures among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 28. The respondents rated their perceptions
of effectiveness for people-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective
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and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for people-oriented measures
across all types of educational institutions was 3.06. PK-12 Private Schools had the highest mean
effectiveness score of 3.306, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean effectiveness score
of 2.97. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard
deviation of 0.68 and varied the least among PK-12 Private Schools with a standard deviation of
0.41.

Table 28
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of People-oriented Measures by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

2.99

0.46

[2.81, 3.15]

2.00

4.14

PK-12 Private School

10

3.30

0.41

[3.00, 3.58]

2.57

3.71

PK-12 Virtual School

17

2.97

0.68

[2.62, 3.31]

1.00

4.00

Public College/University

20

3.03

0.58

[2.75, 3.30]

2.29

4.29

Private College/University

15

3.20

0.52

[2.91, 3.49]

2.14

4.14

Total

93

3.06

0.54

[2.95, 3.17]

1.00

4.29

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of
effectiveness of procedure-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 29). The
results from the analysis revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among
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the types of institutions with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of people-oriented
measures at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.02, p = 0.40].

Table 29
ANOVA: Perceptions of People-Oriented Measures by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

1.18

4

0.29

1.02

0.40

Within Groups

25.39

88

0.29

Total

26.57

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

Research Question 2.6. High Frequency Practices
What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of high-frequency critical
practices among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 30. The respondents indicated the
frequencies with which they performed critical security practices. For practices that were
typically performed multiple times a year, the responses were scored on a scale of 1-5 with 1
being the least frequent and 5 being the most frequent. The mean score for high frequency
practices across all types of educational institutions was 1.24. Private Colleges/Universities had
the highest mean score of 3.24, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean score of 0.29.
The score varied the most among Public Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 2.20
and varied the least among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.65.
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Table 30
Descriptive Statistics of Frequencies of High Frequency Practices by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

0.40

0.85

[0.08, 0.70]

0.00

2.67

PK-12 Private School

10

0.43

0.77

[-0.11, 0.98]

0.00

2.00

PK-12 Virtual School

17

0.29

0.65

[-0.04, 0.63]

0.00

1.67

Public College/University

20

2.27

2.20

[1.23, 3.29]

0.00

5.00

Private College/University

15

3.24

2.08

[2.09, 4.39]

0.00

5.00

Total

93

1.24

1.84

[0.86, 1.62]

0.00

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the frequencies of
implementation of high-frequency critical practices among institutional types (see Table 31). The
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of
institutions with respect to the frequencies of implementation of high-frequency critical practices
at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 14.73, p = 0.00].
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Table 31
ANOVA: Frequencies of High Frequency Practices by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

125.05

4

31.26

14.73

0.00

Within Groups

186.76

88

2.12

Total

311.81

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their frequencies of implementation of highfrequency critical practices (see Table 32). Based on the results, Private Colleges/Universities
showed statistically significant differences from PK-12 Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools
and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively. In addition, Public Colleges/Universities showed
statistically significant differences from PK-12 Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools and PK12 Virtual Schools respectively.
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Table 32
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of High Frequency Practices by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution

MD

SE

Sig

95% CI

PK-12 Public School

PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.04
0.10
-1.87
-2.85

0.53
0.44
0.42
0.46

1.00 [-1.51, 1.44]
1.00 [-1.12, 1.32]
0.00 [-3.03, -0.70]
0.00 [-4.12, -1.57]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.04
0.14
-1.83
-2.81

0.53
0.58
0.56
0.59

1.00 [-1.44, 1.51]
1.00 [-1.47, 1.75]
0.01 [-3.40, -0.26]
0.00 [-4.46, -1.15]

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.10
-0.14
-1.97
-2.95

0.44
0.58
0.48
0.52

1.00 [-1.32, 1.12]
1.00 [-1.75, 1.47]
0.00 [-3.31, -0.63]
0.00 [-4.38, -1.51]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

1.87
1.83
1.97
-0.98

0.42
0.56
0.48
0.50

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.29

[0.70, 3.03]
[0.26, 3.40]
[0.63, 3.31]
[-2.36, 0.40]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

2.85
2.81
2.95
0.98

0.46
0.59
0.52
0.50

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.29

[1.57, 4.12]
[1.15, 4.46]
[1.51, 4.38]
[-0.4, 2.36]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval
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Research Question 2.7. Low Frequency Practices
What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of low-frequency critical
practices among the different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 33. The respondents indicated the
frequencies with which they performed critical security practices and reviewed security related
policies and procedures. For practices that were typically performed once a year or less, the
responses were scored on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least frequent and 5 being the most
frequent. The mean score for low frequency practices across all types of educational institutions
was 1.10. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean score of 1.60, and PK-12 Virtual
Schools had the lowest mean score of 0.74. The score varied the most among PK-12 Public
Schools with a standard deviation of 0.68 and varied the least among PK-12 Virtual Schools with
a standard deviation of 0.43.
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Table 33
Descriptive Statistics of Frequencies of Low Frequency Practices by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

0.83

0.68

[0.58, 1.08]

0.00

2.25

PK-12 Private School

10

1.15

0.54

[0.76, 1.53]

0.13

2.00

PK-12 Virtual School

17

0.74

0.43

[0.51, 0.95]

0.00

1.38

Public College/University

20

1.44

0.53

[1.19, 1.69]

0.25

2.13

Private College/University

15

1.60

0.44

[1.35, 1.84]

0.75

2.13

Total

93

1.10

0.65

[0.97, 1.23]

0.00

2.25

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval

A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the frequencies of
implementation of low-frequency critical practices among institutional types (see Table 34). The
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of
institutions with respect to the frequencies of implementation of low-frequency critical practices
at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 8.44, p = 0.00].
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Table 34
ANOVA: Frequencies of Low Frequency Practices by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

10.63

4

2.66

8.44

0.00

Within Groups

27.70

88

0.32

Total

38.32

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their frequencies of implementation of lowfrequency critical practices (see Table 35). Based on the results, Private Colleges/Universities
showed statistically significant differences with PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual
Schools respectively. In addition, Public Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant
differences with PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively.
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Table 35
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Low Frequency Practices by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution

MD

SE

Sig

95% CI

PK-12 Public School

PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.32
0.10
-0.61
-0.77

0.20
0.17
0.16
0.18

0.53 [-0.88, 0.25]
0.98 [-0.37, 0.56]
0.00 [-1.06, -0.16]
0.00 [-1.25, -0.27]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.32
0.41
-0.29
-0.45

0.20
0.22
0.22
0.23

0.53
0.35
0.66
0.29

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.10
-0.41
-0.71
-0.86

0.17
0.22
0.19
0.20

0.98 [-0.56, 0.37]
0.35 [-1.03, 0.2]
0.00 [-1.22, -0.19]
0.00 [-1.41, -0.31]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

0.61
0.29
0.71
-0.16

0.16
0.22
0.19
0.19

0.00
0.66
0.00
0.93

[0.16, 1.06]
[-0.31, 0.89]
[0.19, 1.22]
[-0.68, 0.37]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

0.77
0.45
0.86
0.16

0.18
0.23
0.20
0.19

0.00
0.29
0.00
0.93

[0.27, 1.25]
[-0.18, 1.08]
[0.31, 1.41]
[-0.37, 0.68]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval
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[-0.25, 0.88]
[-0.2, 1.03]
[-0.89, 0.31]
[-1.08, 0.18]

Research Question 2.8. Budget Allocations
What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to information security among the
different types of educational institutions?
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 36. The respondents indicated on the
ISPI© the allocations for their institutional budgets for information technology with a focus on
information security. The responses were scored on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the lowest budget
allocation and 5 being the highest budget allocation. The mean score for budget allocations
across all types of educational institutions was 1.44. Private Colleges/Universities had the
highest mean score of 2.1l, and PK-12 Public Schools had the lowest mean score of 1.10. The
score varied the most among Public Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.64 and
varied the least among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.42.

Table 36
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Budget Allocation by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

1.10

0.29

[0.99, 1.20]

0.67

2.00

PK-12 Private School

10

1.30

0.43

[0.99, 1.60]

1.00

2.00

PK-12 Virtual School

17

1.29

0.42

[1.07, 1.51]

1.00

2.00

Public College/University

20

1.67

0.64

[1.36, 1.96]

1.00

2.67

Private College/University

15

2.11

0.59

[1.78, 2.43]

1.00

3.00

Total

93

1.44

0.59

[1.32, 1.56]

0.67

3.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the budgetary allocation
related to information security among institutional types (see Table 37). The results from the
analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions with
respect to the budgetary allocation related to information security at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) =
13.46, p = 0.00].

Table 37
ANOVA: Perceptions of Budget Allocation by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

11.99

4

3.00

13.46

0.00

Within Groups

19.60

88

Total

31.59

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their budget allocations (see Table 38). Based on
the results, Private Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant differences with PK-12
Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively. In addition,
Public Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant differences with PK-12 Public
Schools.
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Table 38
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Budget Allocation by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

MD
-0.20
-0.20
-0.57
-1.01

SE
0.17
0.14
0.14
0.15

Sig
95% CI
0.76 [-0.68, 0.27]
0.64 [-0.59, 0.19]
0.00 [-0.94, -0.19]
0.00 [-1.42, -0.60]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.20
0.01
-0.37
-0.81

0.17
0.19
0.18
0.19

0.76 [-0.27, 0.68]
1.00 [-0.51, 0.52]
0.27 [-0.87, 0.14]
0.00 [-1.34, -0.27]

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.20
-0.01
-0.37
-0.82

0.14
0.19
0.16
0.17

0.64 [-0.19, 0.59]
1.00 [-0.52, 0.51]
0.13 [-0.80, 0.06]
0.00 [-1.28, -0.35]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

0.57
0.37
0.37
-0.44

0.14
0.18
0.16
0.16

0.00
0.27
0.13
0.05

[0.19, 0.94]
[-0.14, 0.87]
[-0.06, 0.80]
[-0.89, 0.00]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

1.01
0.81
0.82
0.44

0.15
0.19
0.17
0.16

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05

[0.60, 1.42]
[0.27, 1.34]
[0.35, 1.28]
[0.00, 0.89]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval

Research Question 3
What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational institutions with
respect to information security, and how do results vary across the types of institutions?
Descriptive statistics were used to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of
institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare the overall security
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preparedness scores across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable
was the self-reported information security preparedness level and the independent variable was
the institution type.
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 39. The respondents rated their overall
security preparedness on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least prepared and 5 being the most
prepared. The mean preparedness score across all types of educational institutions was 2.60.
Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean preparedness score of 3.40 and PK-12 Public
Schools had the lowest mean preparedness score of 2.16. The risk score varied the most among
PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 1.07 and varied the least among PK-12
Private Schools with a standard deviation of 0.67.

Table 39
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Overall Security Preparedness by Institution Type
Institution Type

N

Mean

SD

95% CI

Min

Max

PK-12 Public School

31

2.16

1.07

[1.76, 2.55]

1.00

5.00

PK-12 Private School

10

3.00

0.67

[2.52, 3.47]

2.00

4.00

PK-12 Virtual School

17

2.29

1.05

[1.75, 2.83]

1.00

4.00

Public College/University

20

2.75

0.85

[2.35, 3.14]

1.00

4.00

Private College/University

15

3.40

0.74

[2.99, 3.8]

2.00

4.00

Total

93

2.60

1.02

[2.39, 2.81]

1.00

5.00

Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the overall self-reported
level of preparedness among institutional types (see Table 40). The results from the analysis
revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions with respect to
their overall self-reported level of preparedness at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 5.48, p = 0.00].

Table 40 ANOVA: Perceptions of Overall Security Preparedness by Institution Type
Source

SS

Df

MS

F

Sig.

Between Groups

19.21

4

4.80

5.48

0.00

Within Groups

77.07

88

0.88

Total

96.28

92

Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square

A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups
showed statistically significant differences in their overall self-reported preparedness (see Table
41). Based on the results, Private Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant
differences with PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively.
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Table 41
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Overall Security Preparedness by Institution Type
Type of Educational Institution

MD

SE

Sig

95% CI

PK-12 Public School

PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

-0.84
-0.13
-0.59
-1.24

0.34
0.28
0.27
0.29

0.11 [-1.78, 0.10]
0.99 [-0.91, 0.65]
0.19 [-1.33, 0.15]
0.00 [-2.05, -0.41]

PK-12 Private School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.84
0.71
0.25
-0.40

0.34
0.37
0.36
0.38

0.11
0.33
0.96
0.83

PK-12 Virtual School

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
Public College/University
Private College/University

0.13
-0.71
-0.46
-1.11

0.28
0.37
0.31
0.33

0.99 [-0.65, 0.91]
0.33 [-1.74, 0.33]
0.58 [-1.31, 0.40]
0.01 [-2.02, -0.18]

Public
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Private College/University

0.59
-0.25
0.46
-0.65

0.27
0.36
0.31
0.32

0.19
0.96
0.58
0.26

[-0.15, 1.33]
[-1.25, 0.75]
[-0.4, 1.31]
[-1.54, 0.24]

Private
College/University

PK-12 Public School
PK-12 Private School
PK-12 Virtual School
Public College/University

1.25
0.40
1.11
0.65

0.29
0.38
0.33
0.32

0.00
0.83
0.01
0.26

[0.41, 2.05]
[-0.66, 1.46]
[0.18, 2.02]
[-0.24, 1.54]

Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval
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[-0.10, 1.78]
[-0.33, 1.74]
[-0.75, 1.25]
[-1.46, 0.66]

Ancillary Analyses
Additional analyses were conducted to further analyze the initial findings related to the
research questions and to establish identifiable patterns, if any, within the scope of the study.
These analyses included a correlation analysis and a N/A response analysis.
Correlation with Overall Preparedness
A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted using the responses obtained in the ISPI©
to investigate how the overall preparedness scores for each educational institution that
participated in the survey correlated with the mean scores calculated for 25 security threat risk
perception factors, 22 threat prevention measure effectiveness perception factors, 11 key security
practice frequencies, and 3 budget allocation factors respectively. The results are summarized in
Table 42. All the correlations were statistically significant at 0.01 level except for PeopleOriented Threats and Software-Oriented Measures which were significant only at the 0.05 level.
All the security threat risk perception scores showed a negative correlation with overall
preparedness scores, while prevention measure effectiveness perception scores, frequency of key
security practices, and budget allocations showed a positive correlation with overall preparedness
scores. In other words, higher overall preparedness scores were associated with lower security
threat risk perception scores. Similarly, higher overall preparedness scores were associated with
higher prevention measure effectiveness scores, higher frequency of key security practices, and
higher budget allocations.
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Table 42
Correlation with Overall Preparedness
Item
Hardware-Oriented Threats
Software-Oriented Threats
Data-Oriented Threats
People-Oriented Threats
Procedure-Oriented Threats
Hardware-Oriented Measures
Software-Oriented Measures
Data-Oriented Measures
People-Oriented Measures
Procedure-Oriented Measures
High Frequency Practices
Low Frequency Practices
Budget Allocations

Correlation
Coefficient
-0.29

Sig.
0.004

-0.29
-0.28
-0.22
-0.28
0.39
0.25
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.57
0.73
0.68

0.005
0.008
0.031
0.008
0.000
0.014
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Note. All correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.

Analysis of N/A responses
Respondents of the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey, be it
a security threat risk perception score, threat prevention measure effectiveness perception score,
frequency of a key security measure, or a budget allocation item. The N/A response meant that
the item did not apply to the institution concerned. An analysis was completed to find out which
items on the ISPI© had the most N/A responses. Table 43 lists the 10 items that had the most
N/A responses and shows the percentage distribution of each N/A response across the different
types of educational institutions. An analysis of the items identified as having the most N/A
responses revealed that all these items were key security measures. An average of the percentage
distributions for each type of educational institution is provided at the end of the table. PK-12
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Public Schools had the highest percentage of N/A responses followed closely by PK-12 Virtual
Schools. Private Colleges/Universities had the least percentage of N/A responses.

Table 43
Analysis of Not Applicable (N/A) responses

Item
Honey pot experiments

N
76

PK-12
Public
Schools
97%

Social engineering
experiments to enforce
security protocols
Using biometric
authentication for accessing
secure areas
Log review and monitoring

71

94%

90%

100%

55%

33%

76%

70

90%

80%

76%

75%

40%

75%

56

81%

70%

82%

40%

13%

60%

Sending information
technology personnel to
attend information security
classes
Using multi-factor
authentication
Internal security audit

55

74%

60%

88%

40%

20%

59%

49

74%

60%

59%

35%

20%

53%

48

61%

40%

82%

35%

27%

52%

Mandatory training on
security topics for all
employees
Review of data breach
remediation procedures
Employing a dedicated
Information Security
Officer
Average

47

65%

70%

71%

25%

20%

51%

46

71%

60%

59%

25%

20%

49%

38

71%

40%

41%

20%

7%

41%

78%

67%

76%

42%

24%

60%
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PK-12 PK-12 Public Private
Private Virtual College/ College
Schools Schools Univ.
/Univ.
All
100%
100%
65%
40%
82%

Summary
The results of the data analysis for each research question were presented in this chapter
along with applicable descriptive statistics. For Research Question 1, using separate ANOVA
analyses for each of the security risk categories, the researcher found no statistically significant
differences between the types of educational institutions in their assessments of security risks.
For Research Question 2, using separate ANOVA analyses, the researcher found significant
differences between the types of educational institutions in their perceptions of the effectiveness
of security measures, frequencies of key security practices and policy updates, and budget
allocations. Using post-hoc analyses, these differences were isolated to the types of educational
institutions involved. Finally, for Research Question 3, using an ANOVA analysis, the researcher
found that the educational institutions showed statistically significant differences in terms of
their overall assessment of their security preparedness. Using post-hoc analyses, these
differences were isolated to the types of educational institutions involved. A separate analysis
revealed correlations between the overall preparedness of the educational institutions with their
assessments of security risks, their perceptions of the effectiveness of security measures,
frequencies of key security practices and policy updates, and budget allocations. Finally, an
analysis of the not applicable (N/A) responses indicated a distribution of the critical security
measures that were not being implemented by the educational institutions. A summary of the
study, discussion, and recommendations are presented in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Introduction
In the preceding chapter, the results of the data analyses were presented. This chapter
includes a summary of the study and a five-part discussion of findings: (a) Research Question 1
which includes assessments of the different security risks by the different types of educational
institutions, (b) Research Question 2 which includes perceptions of the effectiveness of security
measures, frequencies of key security practices and policy updates, and budget allocations by the
different types of educational institutions, (c) Research Question 3 which includes an overall
assessment of security preparedness by the different types of educational institutions, (d)
additional findings from supplementary analyses, and (e) an overall summary of findings from
the discussion. Implications for practice and recommendations for further research are also
included.
Summary of the Study
The purpose of this exploratory study was to analyze the preparedness of educational
institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing their self-reported
perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding risk-mitigating practices.
The five different types of educational institutions that were included in this study were PK-12
Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools, PK-12 Virtual Schools, Public Colleges/Universities,
and Private Colleges/Universities in the state of Florida. Factors that were studied with reference
to securing institutional data were aligned with the five components of any information system
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware, software, data, procedures, and people. The researcher
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examined the security threats associated with these factors and explored the critical measures
with respect to the factors that can enhance security within the constraints applicable to
educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of the threats to information security, the
researcher further explored the frequencies with which the different types of educational
institutions undertake critical security practices and stay up-to-date with their information
security policies and procedures. Finally, the culture of educational institutions with respect to
implementing information security measures, as reflected in their allocation of budgets for the
same, was explored.
Data for this study were collected using an instrument created by the researcher
exclusively for this study. This questionnaire-based instrument, the Information Security
Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©), was distributed using the survey tool Qualtrix and was used to
measure the preparedness of educational institutions to ensure the security of their institutional
information. The questionnaire primarily focused on four institution specific areas that reflected
institutional preparedness to counter security threats (i.e., threat identification, threat mitigation
practices, frequency of key security practices and updates of established security policies and
practices, and budgetary allocations to enable security measures). The questions pertaining to
these areas were further classified according to the five components of information systems –
hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Emails containing a
link to the questionnaire were sent on March 7, 2018 to individuals overseeing information
security at 218 educational institutions in the state of Florida. A total of 20 PK-12 Private
Schools, 30 Public Colleges or Universities, 30 Private Colleges or Universities, the Florida
Virtual School, 70 PK-12 Virtual Schools, and all 67 PK-12 Public School districts were
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included. The survey remained open through March 31, 2018. A total of 93 responses (42.66%
response rate) were received of which 31 were from PK-12 Public Schools, 10 were from PK-12
Private Schools, 17 were from PK-12 Virtual Schools, 20 were from Public Colleges or
Universities and 15 were from Private Colleges or Universities.
The following research questions were used to guide this study:
1. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security
among educational institutions with respect to identification and classification
of threats, and how do results vary across the types of institutions?
This question was further divided into five sub-questions based on the five
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015):
1.1.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
hardware-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.2.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
software-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.3.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
data-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

1.4.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
procedure-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?
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1.5.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for
people-oriented threats among the different types of educational
institutions?

2. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security
among educational institutions with respect to institutional safeguards,
frequency of critical measures and security policy updates, and budgetary
allocation, and how do results vary across the types of institutions?
This question was further divided into eight sub-questions based on the five
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015), frequency of critical
measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocation:
2.1.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
hardware-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.2.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
software-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.3.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
data-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.4.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
procedure-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?
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2.5.

What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of
people-oriented security measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.6.

What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of
high-frequency critical measures among the different types of
educational institutions?

2.7.

What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of
low-frequency critical measures and security policy updates among the
different types of educational institutions?

2.8.

What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to
information security among the different types of educational
institutions?

3. What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational
institutions with respect to information security, and how do results vary
across the types of institutions?
To answer Research Question 1, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI©
instrument their perceptions of the security risks associated with all recognized threats on a scale
of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. The data obtained for the threats were aggregated to
the level of the five factors of information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and
procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for individual items within each of the fivefactor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the
group mean was calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the
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different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive
statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and thereafter at the type of
institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat
perceptions across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were
the threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems (hardware, software,
data, people, and procedures) and the independent variable was the institution type.
To answer Research Question 2, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI©
instrument their perceptions of the effectiveness of recognized security threat prevention
measures on a scale of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. Thereafter, they were asked to
indicate on the ISPI© instrument the time intervals at which their respective institutions review
and update their specific security policies. Finally, the focus shifted to ascertaining the
institutional cultures in acknowledging the threats to data and implementing measures to prevent
breaches. Respondents were asked to answer questions on the ISPI© instrument about their
institutional allocation of operational and personnel budgetary funds, and the reporting lines of
the head of information technology for this purpose. The data obtained for the threat prevention
measures were aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems: hardware,
software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for individual items
within each of the five factor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar institutions were
grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a
combination of descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level
and thereafter at the type of institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were
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conducted to compare threat prevention measures across the different types of educational
institutions. The dependent variables were the threat prevention measures aggregated to the level
of the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedures), and
the independent variable was the institution type. The responses about frequencies of key
security measures and security policy updates were analyzed using descriptive statistics to
ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. Two separate ANOVA
procedures were conducted to compare the frequencies of key security measures across the
different types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were the frequencies of key
security measures and the independent variable was the institution type. Finally, the responses
obtained from similar institutions for the budget allocation percentages were grouped together
(i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the
different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was completed using descriptive
statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA
procedure was conducted to compare budget allocations for information security across the
different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the budget allocations,
and the independent variable was the institution type.
To answer Research Question 3, the respondents were asked to rank their overall
information security preparedness on a scale of 1-5. The responses obtained from similar
institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type to
obtain response profiles for the different types of institutions). The analysis of the data collected
was performed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of
institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare the overall threat preparation
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index across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the selfreported information security preparedness level, and the independent variable was the institution
type.
Additional analyses were conducted to further analyze findings from the data analyses for
the research questions and to establish identifiable patterns, if any, within the scope of the study.
These analyses included a correlation analysis and a not applicable (N/A) response analysis.
The correlation analysis was conducted using the responses obtained in the ISPI© to
investigate how each of the mean scores of security threat risk perception factors, threat
prevention measure effectiveness perception factors, frequency of key security practices, and
budget allocations correlated with the overall preparedness scores for each educational institution
that participated in the survey. The purpose of this analysis was to investigate which of the
factors had the most impact on the overall institutional threat preparedness.
Respondents to the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey, be it
a security threat risk perception score, threat prevention measure effectiveness perception score,
or a frequency of a key security measure. A not applicable (N/A) response meant that the item
concerned did not apply to the institution concerned. In other words, the institution concerned
did not implement the item as a threat prevention measure or did not consider the item as a
significant risk. An analysis was performed to identify the 10 items on the ISPI© that had the
most N/A responses and how such N/A responses were distributed across the different types of
educational institutions. The averages of the percentage distributions of the identified N/A
response items were then calculated for each type of educational institution. The purpose of this
analysis was to help identify how the N/A responses were distributed across the types of
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educational institutions which, in turn, assisted in the identification of the types of educational
institutions that were most frequently failing to implement key security measures.
Discussion of the Findings
Research Question 1
The respondents rated their perceptions of security risks for threats on a scale of 1-5 on
the ISPI© with 1 being the least risky and 5 being the riskiest. The responses were aggregated
based on the five components of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware,
software, data, procedures, and people; and group means were calculated. Participants from
Private Colleges/Universities showed the least variance in their responses. Five separate
ANOVA tests (one for each component) revealed no statistically significant differences between
the types of educational institutions in their assessments of security risks. Perceptions of peopleoriented threats had the highest aggregate mean of 3.80. This finding matched a finding in a prior
study by Keller et al. (2005).
The findings revealed that the different types of educational institutions identified
information security risks in similar ways. Given that the security risks identified for this survey
were dynamic in nature, it can be inferred that at present, different educational institutions have
similar perceptions of security threats and are keeping up with the knowledge of the continuous
changes in the field of information security in similar ways.
Research Question 2
The respondents rated their perceptions of the effectiveness of measures to counter
security risks for threats on a scale of 1-5 on the ISPI© with 1 being the least effective and 5
being the most effective. The responses were aggregated based on the five components of
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information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware, software, data, procedures, and
people; and group means were calculated. Participants from Public Colleges/Universities and
Private Colleges/Universities showed the least variance in their responses. Perceptions of the
effectiveness of data-oriented measures had the highest mean overall effective score of 4.01.
Four of five separate ANOVA tests (one for each component) revealed significant differences
between the types of educational institutions in their perceptions of the effectiveness of security
measures. The only component that did not show any significant difference between the different
types of educational institutions was the perception of effectiveness of people-oriented measures.
Post-hoc tests conducted on the components that showed significant differences revealed the
source of such differences between the types of educational institutions. Private
Colleges/Universities were involved in most of such differences.
The respondents included in the ISPI© the frequencies with which they performed
critical security practices and review their security policies and procedures. In addition, the
respondents answered questions in the ISPI© regarding their institutional budget allocations for
information security. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean scores for the
frequencies of security practices and policy updates as well as for the allocation of budgets. Two
separate ANOVA tests were run for the frequency responses (one each for low frequency
measures and high frequency measures). An ANOVA test was run for the budgetary responses as
well. These tests revealed significant differences between the types of educational institutions in
their frequencies of critical security practices and review of security policies as well as in their
budget allocations. Post-hoc tests conducted revealed the source of such differences between the
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types of educational institutions. Private Colleges/Universities were again involved in most of
such differences.
The findings revealed that the educational institutions had differences in their perceptions
of effectiveness of their security risk mitigation practices, including the frequencies of
occurrence. However, the perceptions of effectiveness of people-oriented risk mitigation
practices did not show any difference across the different types of educational institutions.
Because these risk mitigation practices and their frequencies of operation are universal, it can be
inferred that there could be differences in their implementation across the different types of
educational institutions. In addition, because these measures incur an expenditure, a
corresponding difference in the budgetary allocation scores for information security related
activities was an expected finding. An analysis of the budgetary allocation scores did reveal such
differences across the different educational institution types.
An interesting finding was that no significant difference was observed for the perception
of effectiveness of people-oriented measures across the different educational institution types. It
can thus be inferred that educational institutions have been undertaking security measures that
involve people in similar ways. One possible explanation for this is the relatively lower cost of
implementation of people-centric security practices which are primarily based on user training
and instruction as compared to the more sophisticated and expensive measures that apply to the
other factors (hardware, software, data, and procedures). This allows most institutions to
implement similar user-oriented practices with similar effects in risk prevention. A possible
counter explanation could be that institutions find people-oriented measures ineffective,
irrespective of the cost involved, as human behaviors are the most difficult to manage and
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predict; thus, they rate their effectiveness with similar scores which are typically low. In this
study the mean of the people-oriented measures was 3.05, which is somewhere in the middle of
the 1-5 range. So, the first explanation seems more plausible, but the counter explanation cannot
be discounted.
Research Question 3
The respondents rated their overall information security preparedness on a scale of 1-5 on
the ISPI© with 1 being the least prepared and 5 being the most prepared. The responses were
aggregated based on the five components of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015):
hardware, software, data, and procedures and people; and group means were calculated.
Participants from PK-12 Private Schools showed the least variance in their responses, and
Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean preparedness score of 3.40. An ANOVA test
that was conducted showed significant differences between the types of educational institutions
in their perceptions of their overall information security preparedness. Post-hoc tests conducted
revealed the source of such differences to be between Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12
Public Schools and between Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools.
In a review of the overall mean scores (Table 39), participants from PK-12 Public
Schools averaged an overall preparedness score of 2.16 and those from PK-12 Virtual Schools
averaged an overall preparedness score of 2.29. Compared to the average score of 3.40 for
Private Colleges/Universities, the scores of PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools
were significantly lower.
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Ancillary Analyses Findings
A correlation analysis was conducted to determine how each of the security threat risk
scores, threat prevention measure effectiveness scores, frequency of key security practices, and
budget allocations correlated with overall preparedness scores across all educational institutions.
The results were summarized in Table 42. All of the correlations were significant at the 0.05
level and the 0.01 level except for those with people-oriented threats and with software-oriented
measures which were significant only at the 0.05 level. All the security threat risk scores showed
a negative correlation with overall preparedness scores, but prevention measure effectiveness
scores, frequency of key security practices, and budget allocations showed a positive correlation
with overall preparedness scores. In other words, higher overall preparedness scores were
correlated with lower security threat risk scores. Similarly, higher overall preparedness scores
were correlated with higher prevention measure effectiveness scores, higher frequency of key
security practices, and higher budget allocations. The strongest correlations were observed for
the overall preparedness score with Low Frequency Practices, Budget Allocations and High
Frequency Practices (correlation coefficients of 0.73, 0.68 and 0.57 respectively). On further
review of the post-hoc tests done after the ANOVA tests for Low Frequency Practices, Budget
Allocations and High Frequency Practices, it was observed that significant differences existed
between Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Private Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools
respectively. Thus, it can be inferred that frequency of security practices and budget allocations
are the strongest contributors to the overall preparedness score for an institution.
Respondents of the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey be it
a security threat risk score, threat prevention measure effectiveness score, or a frequency of a key
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security measure. The N/A response meant that item did not apply to the institution concerned.
An analysis was completed to identify which items on the ISPI© had the most N/A responses.
Table 43 lists the 10 items that had the most N/A responses and shows the percentage
distribution of each type of educational institution that responded with an N/A response. All
these items are key security measures. PK-12 Public Schools had the highest percentage of N/A
responses followed closely by PK-12 Virtual Schools. Private Colleges/Universities had the least
percentage of N/A responses.
Thus, it can be observed that PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools were not
conducting a significant number of key security measures. It can be inferred from this finding
that these institutions were having to deal with a lack of adequate personnel or expertise to
perform these key security procedures which in turn can be associated with a smaller budget
allocation. This finding confirms the earlier finding of frequency of security practices and budget
allocations to be the strongest contributors to the overall preparedness score for an institution.

Implications for Practice
This researcher grouped responses about threat perceptions, security measures and
overall preparedness by the type of institution and analyzed them based on the five factors of
information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and procedures. These metrics show the
differences in self-reported security preparedness among the types of institutions. Educational
institutions are always in the process of balancing the conflicting demands of open culture,
convenience of users and information security. In addition, there are other implications for the
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information security environment of an educational institution. Personnel, employee
certification, and outsourcing security pose constraints in the discussion of implications.
The presence of a dedicated information security department can make a substantial
difference in terms of an educational institution’s security policies and procedures. The number
of employees dedicated to implement and manage information security also speaks to the
importance of security issues. Some of these employees often have duties assigned to them other
than information security. Medium to small institutions often have only one person, and
sometimes in a part-time capacity, taking on the information security duties.
The security certification of the employee(s) in charge of security is a significant factor.
Given the salaries certified professionals are presently enjoying, most schools and smaller
colleges find it difficult to be competitive, and most of the educational institutions often try to
grow the person from within. When institutions do take the time to train information security
staff, they are very likely to be hired away from them.
To offset the lack of personnel or lack of expertise in the areas of information security,
some institutions (especially smaller ones) may consider security as a service, essentially
outsourcing the security management responsibilities to an outside company. This may prove to
be a cost-effective solution for some institutions.
Suggestions for Future Research
This exploratory study concentrated on self-reported preparedness of educational
institutions. Because such institutions are always in the process of balancing the contrasting
requirements of culture, convenience and security, such responses may only reflect what they
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feel they are doing right. Gaps may still exist in their actual security preparedness and what they
perceive it to be.
Student population size is an important factor in information security in educational
institutions because it often directly affects the institution’s budget allocation. In other words, the
smaller the institution, the fewer resources it typically has to allocate towards information
security initiatives. This study did not differentiate the selected educational institutions in terms
of this factor. A future study may be considered where institutions may be differentiated in terms
of student population size. For example, small (0-15,000), medium (15001-60,000) and large
(60,001 and above).
This study focused on a cross-section of educational institutions in the state of Florida.
To study far-reaching trends and eliminate any regional or state-wide bias, a future study may
need to be conducted that would include responses from educational institutions nationwide.
Future research may also include a design of an "information security matrix" which
dynamically assigns weights to threats and measures based on their severity and prevalence with
time. This matrix may then evaluate the preparedness of each institution by comparing their
measures with established standards dynamically and making necessary adjustments based on
budgets, school-size, profile and other parameters. The output from this matrix-based process
would be a score that will reflect the actual preparedness of each institution. This could
potentially be designed along the lines of the framework used by the corporate credit-rating
agencies like Moody’s Investor Service, Standard & Poor, and Fitch Ratings, that evaluate
investment products like bonds and by individual credit-rating agencies like Experian, Equifax
and Trans Union, that evaluate credit scores of individuals on pre-set parameters. To ensure
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compliance, such a matrix-based security preparedness evaluation tool may be maintained at the
state-level and be used to evaluate the information security performance of each institution on an
annual basis.
Summary
This exploratory study was an attempt to find any significant differences in the
information security preparedness among different types of educational institutions. The
researcher found that though institutions differed in terms of their perceptions of effectiveness of
security measures, frequencies of security operations and policy reviews, and budgetary
allocations, they had very similar understandings of the risks associated with the security threats.
This study was conducted to analyze the security practice gaps that were revealed, to identify
potential causes and explore options by which gaps may be bridged.
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APPENDIX C
CHRONBACH’S ALPHA TEST FOR RELIABILITY
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The Information Security Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©) used in this study was
checked for reliability and consistency using Chronbach’s Alpha. The results are as follows:

Reliability Statistics for ISPI©

Cronbach's
Alpha
.767

Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items
N of Items
.788

14

The Reliability Statistics shows the value of the Chronbach’s Alpha coefficient. If the
coefficient is above 0.70, the instrument has high internal consistency. In this case the coefficient
was 0.767 which shows that the ISPI© had high internal consistency and was thus reliable.
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